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I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the "most closely fought and in some respects surprising
[decisions] of the term," and "[w]ith five separate opinions totaling 106
pages," the 5-4 decision of Apprendi v. New Jersey' is likely to have broad
consequences in the area of defendant sentencing.2 The new issue troubling
courts throughout the nation is the breadth and scope of the Apprendi rule
that any fact, other than prior conviction, used to extend a defendant's
sentence over the statutory maximum, must be charged in an indictment, and
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.' While the majority lauds this
case as a return to "the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our
criminal justice system" used to protect individuals' liberty and due process
rights, the dissent fears a "watershed change in constitutional law" which
has overruled many of the sentencing factor schemes upheld by the Court in
its landmark decision McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).' In
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Trial by Jury; New Jersey Hate Crime Law Struck
Down, N.Y. TIMES, June, 27, 2000, at A19. "Rarely has any case had such an immediate and
dramatic impact on the practice of law." Erwin Chemerinsky, A Dramatic Change in Sentencing
Practices, 36 SuP. CT. REV. 102, 102 (2000) (providing a good overview of the Apprendi decision);
see also Brooke A. Masters, High Court Ruling May Rewrite Sentencing; Changes in Guidelines,
Raft of Appeals Feared After Justices' Decision, WASH. POST, July 23, 2000, at A1, available at
2000 WL 19620694 (describing Apprendi as "[a] largely overlooked U.S. Supreme Court
decision .... " because it came out "the same week as rulings in long-awaited cases such as, the one
that upheld Miranda warnings .... ," another that rejected a law banning "partial birth" abortions,
and a third that allowed the Boy Scouts of America to bar gays).
3. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90; see also Rocco Cammarere, Apprendi Snowballs Huge
Fallout From Ruling Focusing On Sentences, 9 N.J. LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER 1977, Oct. 9, 2000,
at 41.
4. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497, 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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McMillan, the Court effectively ushered in a sentencing factor revolution
that "radically restructured the roles of judge and jury by shifting to the court
the ability to make at sentencing, and by a preponderance of the evidence,
factual determinations that, prior to McMillan, had to be made by juries, at
trial, and beyond a reasonable doubt."' Depending on how expansively
Apprendi is read, McMillan has been overruled or greatly scaled back
because these facts must now be submitted to a jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt.6 The dissent argues the decision casts substantial doubt on
the continuing validity of the federal Sentencing Guidelines and capital
punishment procedures used in many states! Tellingly, state and federal
courts, as well as legislatures are currently feeling Apprendi's impact in the
area of drug offenses where there have been numerous appeals by prisoners
convicted under statutes that are now unconstitutional after Apprendi.8
Although Apprendi may have its biggest impact in drug cases,9 the
decision dealt with the seemingly limited issue of whether New Jersey's
hate-crime statute, which allowed a judge to find a defendant acted with
racial prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence, was constitutional.'"
Charles Apprendi fired several shots into his African-American neighbor's
house and confessed to police that he wanted to send a message that black
people were not wanted in his neighborhood." He pleaded guilty to a
weapons violation and possession of a bomb in his home, which carried a
ten-year statutory maximum prison sentence. 2 However, because a judge
5. Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for the "Tail of the Dog": Finding
"Elements" of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEArrLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1058
(1999). It is interesting to note that Richard Singer's article advocates that juries and not judges
should find facts, and that Singer also assisted Charles Apprendi in his appeal to the Supreme Court.
See id. at 1112; see also Melanie Burney, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Court to Consider Whether
Judge Should Have Added Punishment, ABC NEWS.COM (Mar. 28, 2000) (commenting on Singer's
role in the Apprendi case), at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/sctus-hatecrimes
000328.html.
6. See Greenhouse, supra note 2, at A19; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 533 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Harv. L. Rev. Ass'n, Note, Winship on Rough Waters: The Erosion of the Reasonable
Doubt Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1102 (1993) (discussing how at the time the Supreme
Court "has shown no eagerness to modify the McMillan approach, leaving sentencing proceedings as
perhaps the single most important erosion of Winship['s]" beyond a reasonable doubt and jury
requirements). But cf Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-93 (finding the statute in Apprendi runs counter to
Winship and declining to apply the McMillan five-factor test), 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing the Court should admit it is overruling McMillan).
7. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 536-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 555-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8. Cammarere, supra note 3, at 41.
9. Lawrence Messina, U.S. Supreme Court Influencing Sentencing Here Ruling Could Radically
Change How Judges Calculate Prison Terms in Federal Court, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY
MAIL, July 25, 2000, at A2, available at 2000 WL 2619088.
10. SeeApprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69.
11. Id. at 469.
12. Id. at 469-70; see also State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 486-87 (N.J. 1999).
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believed Apprendi selected his victim based on race, his sentence was
extended beyond the statutory maximum, to twelve years imprisonment.'3
The Court in Apprendi attempted to resolve the issue of when
facts/factors such as hate motive can be found by a judge using a
preponderance of the evidence, and when they are an element of the crime
that must be submitted to a jury and subjected to the most stringent
evidentiary standard." More specifically, the Court asked whether a fact that
extends a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum is a
sentencing factor, which can be proven by a judge by a preponderance of the
evidence, or an element of the offense, which must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 Essentially, the Court concluded that when
hatred is used to enhance a defendant's sentence because the defendant acted
with the "'purpose to intimidate' on account of, inter alia, race," then this
fact is an element of the crime because it goes to the criminal's mens rea.6
Most importantly, the Court held that any fact, other than recidivism, which
"increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' 7
This Note will analyze the Apprendi decision, discuss its potential
impact, and argue that it should be narrowly construed. Part II traces the
development of major cases that makeup the Supreme Court's due process
jurisprudence and Apprendi's foundation. Case law will be examined to
determine the policy and constitutional concems that drive whether a fact is
an element of a crime or a sentencing factor. 9 This section will also discuss
how the McMillan five-factor test has influenced the Supreme Court's
interpretation of sentencing factors and the tensions this test has created with
previous decisions that seem to require the beyond a reasonable doubt
13. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470-71.
14. Erwin Chemerinsky, Law Enforcement and Criminal Law Decisions, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 517,
520 (2001).
15. Id. Determining whether a defendant committed a criminal act because they hated the
victim's race, religion, sexual orientation, or gender, is a difficult and complex endeavor because the
very "deepest recesses of the human mind" must be probed in order to "prove the existence of
inappropriate thoughts" motivated particular criminal acts. Robert J. Corry, Jr., Burn This Article: It
Is Evidence In Your Thought Crime Prosecution, 4 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 461, 470 (2000). At trial,
the defendant's friendships, relationships, memberships and even bookshelves are scrutinized and
criticized to determine if there is any evidence of bias towards a particular group. Id. at 471, 475.
Due to the sensitive nature of this task, and the significant deprivation of liberty the defendant faces,
determining the existence of one's hate motive should be done by a jury and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 481.
16. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 492-93 & nn.17-18 (noting mens rea is a core element of a crime); see
also Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 519-21.
17. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
18. See infra notes 29-145 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 29-58 and accompanying text.
standard whenever a defendant's sentence is increased." Part III presents the
statement of facts in Apprendi' Part IV provides an in-depth analysis of the
Court's rationale in the majority," concurring,23 and dissenting opinions.'
Part V will evaluate the potential impact of the Court's holding on thejudicial system, legislature,26 and individuals. 7  The Note will briefly
conclude in Part VI.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. In re Winship: An Analysis of the Constitutional and Policy Concerns
Supporting a Jury Finding Facts Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Over a
Judicial Determination by a Preponderance of the Evidence
The Supreme Court has never determined whether the Constitution
requires reasonable doubt to be defined, 9 however, this level of proof is
frequently characterized as "moral certainty" or "the highest degree of
certitude based on [the] evidence."' On the other end of the proof spectrum
is the preponderance of the evidence standard,3' which is thought of as being
a standard that is proven merely by producing the greater quantum of
evidence. 2 In order to clarify when each standard is appropriate in criminal
20. See infra notes 58-145 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 146-170 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 171-209 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 210-227 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 228-274 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 275-369 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 370-379 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 380-397 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 398-406 and accompanying text.
29. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 26 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Although it is clear
that trial courts must instruct juries that they can only convict if the proof is beyond a reasonable
doubt, it is uncertain whether trial judges must give juries a definition of the standard. Jessica N.
Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving Meaning to a Critical Concept, 22 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 677, 678 (1995); see also generally Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof In
Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 112-18 (1999)
(discussing various jurisdictional approaches to defining beyond a reasonable doubt and urging those
that do not define to provide guidance to their juries).
30. Id. at 111.
31. Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Criminal Acts and Sentencing Facts: Two Constitutional Limits on
Criminal Sentencing, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 459, 489-90 (1993). Clear and convincing evidence
is the intermediate standard, which sits between the highest standard - beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the lowest level of proof - preponderance of the evidence. Id. Clear and convincing proof is
defined as being highly probable or reasonably certain. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed.
1999).
32. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970). The Supreme Court explained
"'preponderance of the evidence is... [e]vidence which is ... more convincing than the
evidence.., offered in opposition to it ... ' Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137
n.9 (1997) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Additionally, unlike beyond a reasonable
732
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cases, the Supreme Court has developed case law that focuses on the due
process requirements of the Constitution.3
The Court held for the first time in In re Winship that every element of a
crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. This seminal
case became the foundation for cases like Mullaney v. Wilbur, yet appeared
to be reduced in importance by later cases like Patterson v. New York,
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, and Almendarez-Torres v. United States that
endorsed judicial finding of facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ultimately, Winship along with these other cases stand for the proposition
that the Court has attempted to balance the competing interests of the State's
need to penalize guilty persons, and the equally important goal of protecting
the accused's liberty.' Furthermore, the Court recognizes that state
legislatures must have great flexibility in defining elements of crimes and
sentencing factors.37
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution provide that no person shall "be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."38  Although it is a
fundamental principle of common law that the prosecution must prove to a
jury that the accused is guilty of every element of the crime charged beyond
a reasonable doubt, 9 it was not until 1970 that the Supreme Court held that
doubt and clear and convincing evidence, under a preponderance standard, "'both parties [] share the
risk of error in roughly equal fashion,' except that 'when the evidence is evenly balanced, the [party
with the burden of persuasion] must lose."' Id. (quotations omitted).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 34-145.
34. Harv. L. Rev. Ass'n, supra note 6, at 1094.
35. Id. at 1093-94, 1100-03; see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975) (holding
prosecution must prove facts critical to criminal culpability); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
214-15 (1977) (limiting the holding of Mullaney and giving legislatures broad discretion to define
elements of crimes); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-91 (1986) (coining the term
"sentencing factor" and setting forth a five-factor test to determine whether the sentencing factor is
constitutional); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (upholding recidivism as a
sentencing factor even though it extended conviction beyond statutory maximum).
36. Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 496-97.
37. See infra notes 59-83 and accompanying text. Whether a fact is defined as an element or
sentencing factor makes a significant difference in the kinds of rights and procedural protections that
are triggered. Timothy Crooks, Grid & Bear It: Sentencing Enhancements or Elements: What's In a
Name?, 23 CHAMPION 40, 40 (1999). A fact that is an element must be proved by the prosecution
beyond a reasonable doubt and submitted to the jury. Id. Also, when there is a constitutional right
to grand jury indictment, the fact must be charged in the indictment. Id. In contrast, a sentencing
factor/fact (sentencing enhancement) adds to the length of sentence that a defendant faces and
usually only needs to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence to a judge. Id. Furthermore, it
need not be charged in the indictment. Id.
38. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. Additionally, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right
to a jury in all criminal trials. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). A higher level of proof in criminal trials has been
required since ancient times and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard has been in use since the
733
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard must be used at every criminal
trial.' In Winship, a twelve-year-old boy was charged with larceny for
entering a woman's locker and stealing $11 2.4' The judge admitted that
there was not enough proof to convict beyond a reasonable doubt, but that
the defendant was guilty under the lesser standard by a preponderance of the
evidence.42  The Court explicitly held that the Fourteenth Amendment
provides the constitutional guarantee that every fact necessary to prove the
crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.43  The Court found that
due process requires a high level of persuasion, because the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard is part of the "historically grounded rights of our
system.""
Furthermore, the Constitution mandates this standard because it serves
policy interests that are of the utmost importance in our criminal system.5
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard reduces the risk of convicting an
innocent person because of factual errorj and ensures that he will not lose
his liberty nor be subjected to social stigmatization, except upon a finding
based on the highest level of proof. 7 The standard also "'impresses on the
trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the
facts in issue. ' ' ' ' Finally, this level of persuasion is needed to "command
the respect and confidence of the community" and ensure "the moral force
of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned." 9
earliest years of our nation. Id. However, the term "beyond a reasonable doubt" appeared as late as
1798. Id.; see also Solan, supra note 29, at 110 (finding the term began being widely used circa the
late eighteenth or early nineteenth century, and it was not until the later part of the nineteenth
century that there was consensus among the courts that this expression was used to describe the
highest level of proof).
40. Cohen, supra note 29, at 678.
41. Winship, 397 U.S. at 360.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 364. The Court also held that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies equally
to adults and juveniles when they are charged with a crime which if committed by an adult would be
a crime. Id. at 359, 365.
44. Id. at 362-63.
45. Id. at 363-64. In our criminal system, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a constitutional
safeguard that goes hand-in-hand with the accused's right to notice of charges, right of confrontation
and examination, right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 368. These
constitutional safeguards are all accuracy-enhancing rights that guard against arbitrary verdicts and
make the outcome of the proceeding more certain. Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 464.
46. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
47. Id. The Court stated that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard presumes the innocence of
the accused because it would be fundamentally unfair to imprison a person for many years and take
away his freedom based on the lesser standard used in a civil case. Id. The beyond a reasonable
doubt standard is proper "' [w]here one party has at stake an interest of transcending value ....'
such as their liberty; which justifies that the other party, the prosecution, bear this high level of
burden of proof. Id. at 364 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958)).
48. Id. (quoting Norman Dorsen & Daniel A. Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile
Law, 1 FAM. L. Q., No. 4, at 1, 26 (1967)).
49. Id.
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Although Justice Harlan conceded that the varying standards of proof
are vague, imprecise, "not a very sure guide to decisionmaking," and that at
the very best all the factfinder can do is acquire a "belief of what probably
happened,"5 the level of persuasion used is critical. "[A] standard of proof
represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of
confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication."5  Most importantly, the
standard of proof used is key in effecting the outcome of whether a criminal
is guilty or innocent. 2 Under a preponderance of the evidence standard,
guilty defendants are more frequently convicted.53 However, under this level
of proof, there is also a greater risk of finding innocent people guilty.
Conversely, when beyond a reasonable doubt is used, more guilty
defendants go free, but fewer innocent people are wrongly convicted. As a
result, "the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of
litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the
comparative social disutility of each." 6 Therefore, as Justice Harlan stated
in his famous concurrence,57 this means that in a criminal trial, every element
of a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt because "it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.""
B. Mullaney v. Wilbur and Patterson v. New York: Striking the Balance
Between Facts that Must be Proved Beyond a Reasonable Doubt and the
Legislature's Ability to Define Which Facts Can be Found by a
Preponderance of the Evidence
In order to determine what level of protection an accused receives under
the Due Process Clause, the Court looks at the type of proceeding involved
and the interests a criminal defendant has at stake.59 This raises the question
of what burden of proof should be used to determine particular facts.60 The
50. Id. at 369-70 (Harlan, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 370.
52. See id. at 370-7 1.
53. See id. at 371.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 371. Justice Harlan explained that in criminal cases the social utility of convicting a
guilty person is outweighed by the concern of erroneously finding someone guilty. Id. at 372.
57. Solan, supra note 29, at 109.
58. Winship, 397 U.S. at 372.
59. Todd Meadow, Almendarez-Torres v. United States: Constitutional Limitations on
Government's Power to Define Crimes, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1583, 1583 (1999).
60. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 369 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur6 strengthened Winship by holding that facts
which are important to proving the crime itself was committed, such as
mental state, must be proved by the prosecution and found beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury.62
In Mullaney, the statute was found unconstitutional because there was a
statutory presumption that the defendant committed the crime of murder
with "malice aforethought," unless the defendant could show by a
preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion.63 The
effect of this statute was that the prosecution did not have to prove the
defendant's mental state beyond a reasonable doubt because it was
presumed.' Therefore, the burden rested on the defendant to show heat of
passion by a preponderance of the evidence." The Court held that an
important factor, such as mental state, cannot be presumed and the
prosecution must prove the factor exists to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.6
The Court compared Mullaney to Winship and found that mental state
was an important factor because the due process interests implicated here
were greater than those at stake in Winship.' In Mullaney the defendant
"face[d] a differential in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a
mandatory life sentence" based on whether the mental state was found to
exist.' Based on this analysis, the Court made clear that the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all critical facts that make up the
crime. The Court reasoned that,
61. 421 U.S. 684(1975).
62. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-99, 704. Mullaney clarified Winship by holding that due
process safeguards extend "'to determinations that [go] not [only] to a defendant's guilt or
innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence."' Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 484 (2000) (quoting
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 684, 251 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Under Mullaney, any fact
which is critical to proving the crime and bears heavily on the length of sentence must be proved by
the State. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 701.
63. Id. at 689, 703; see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 200-01 (1977) (describing
why the statute in Mullaney was unconstitutional).
64. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 688.
65. Id. at 686-88. If the defendant proved heat of passion, the result was that his sentence would
be reduced to manslaughter. Id.
66. Id. at 701-02, 704.
67. Id. at 700. In Winship, the defendant only faced an eighteen-month sentence, with the
possible extension of four and one-half years of imprisonment. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 701. This is mandated by Winship's rational that "'[w]here one party has at stake
an interest of transcending value ....' such as liberty, the prosecution bears the burden of proving
the existence of key facts that if found, would result in that liberty being taken away. Id. at 699-701
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-
72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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if Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as
defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests
that decision sought to protect" just by redefining "the elements that
constitut[ed] different crimes, characterizing them as factors that
bear solely on the extent of punishment. "
Furthermore, although in Mullaney the judge was not determining the
factor by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court recognized that "[t]he
safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailing simply because a
determination may already have been reached that would stigmatize the
defendant and that might lead to a significant impairment of personal
liberty."7' Thus, Mullaney would be the foundation for the holding in
Apprendi where the Court determined that a judge could not use a
preponderance of the evidence standard to determine the important mental
element of racial hate."2
Two years later, the Court in Patterson v. New York" began limiting the
breadth of Mullaney.' The Court recognized that setting up criminal
procedure policies and defining elements of crimes is a traditional state
function, and that the judiciary "should not lightly construe the Constitution
so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States.""
Based on principles of state sovereignty, it is proper to defer to the states'
procedures and definitions, unless they "'offen[d] some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."' 76 As a result of Patterson, the burden of proof can be shifted
to the defendant" as long as the prosecution proves "every ingredient of an
70. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 240 (1998) (quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S.
at 688) (analyzing the relationship between Mullaney and Winship),
71. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698.
72. Winship is not limited to those facts that are defined as elements of the crime by the states
because "Winship is concerned with substance rather than this kind of formalism." Id. at 698-99; see
also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494-95 (2000) (quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698)
(concluding the New Jersey statute "runs directly into our warning in Mullaney that Winship is
concerned as much with the category of substantive offense as 'with the degree of criminal
culpability' assessed" and therefore states may not redefine the elements of the crime). Hate motive
is an element of a crime if it increases the punishment beyond the maximum statutory range.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494-95.
73. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
74. See id. at 214-15. "[Tlhe Mullaney holding should not be so broadly read" because states can
define the elements of a crime and allocate burdens of proof. Id. at 215.
75. Id. at 201. The Court explained in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986), that
"Patterson stressed that in determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
state legislature's definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive ...."
76. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
77. See id. at 203 n.9, 210.
offense beyond a reasonable doubt," and does not "shift the burden of proof
to the defendant by presuming that ingredient ...... as seen in Mullaney. s
This means that once facts constituting the crime, including defendant's
mental state, are established by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt,
the court may refuse to sustain an affirmative defense, like insanity, unless
the defendant proves it by a preponderance of the evidence.9 Unlike
Mullaney, where the prosecution never had to prove the absence of heat of
passion, here the State must prove the defendant's mens rea beyond a
reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the defendant can rebut by showing
insanity.' As a result, states have great flexibility in determining which
facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and those that may be
found by a preponderance of the evidence as long as the prosecution proves
the critical facts (elements of a crime) beyond a reasonable doubt.' Thus,
states are free to define crimes and allocate burdens of proof "without any
impediment from Winship,"2 with the caveat that "'[i]t is not within the
province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively
guilty of a crime." 83
78. Id. at 215. In Patterson, the statute required the state to prove every element of the crime of
murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and made the defendant prove the affirmative defense of insanity
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 199-200.
79. Id. at 205-06.
80. See id. at 205-07 (finding that the government proved "'every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which [Patterson was] charged') ((alteration in original) (quoting In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). States can require the affirmative defense be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence because this makes it more certain that the affirmative defense, such as insanity, really
exists. See id. at 209. If defendants did not have to prove the affirmative defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, then many guilty persons would go free under the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard because the slightest indication that the person was insane could result in
an acquittal. See id. at 208. Furthermore, "[d]ue process does not require that every conceivable
step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person." Id.
81. See id. at 207. State legislatures have flexibility to allocate burdens of proof because
"[t]raditionally, due process has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed;
more subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the accused have been left to the
legislative branch." Id. at 210. As long as states stay within constitutional boundaries by proving
beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements that define the crime, then states are free to reallocate
burdens of proof for other facts. See id. Thus, the prosecution need not bear the difficult burden and
heavy risk of proving all facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 207-08.
82. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 241 (1999). But cf Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 (noting
"there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go").
83. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 (quoting McFarland v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86
(1916)). "The legislature cannot 'validly command that the finding of an indictment, or mere proof
of the identity of the accused, should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts essential
to guilt."' Id. (quoting Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943)).
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C. McMillan v. Pennsylvania: The Court Creates a Five-Factor Test to
Determine When Sentencing Factors Can be Found by a Judge Using a
Preponderance of the Evidence
The Court significantly extended legislatures' discretion to allocate
burdens of proof to particular facts when it decided 5-4 in McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, that judges could use "sentencing factors" to enhance or
reduce a defendant's punishment. ' Again, the Court deferred to the state's
definition of the elements of the crime and evidentiary standards noting that
the legislature expressly identified the statutory provision as a sentencing
factor." The Court recognized that it has "never attempted to define
precisely the constitutional limits noted in Patterson, i.e., the extent to which
due process forbids the reallocation or reduction of burdens of proof in
criminal cases ..... " and did not attempt to do so in McMillan.6 Instead of
setting forth a bright-line test, the Court used five factors to determine
whether the sentencing factor/allocation of burden scheme was valid.87
The statute in McMillan required the prosecution to prove the elements
of various felonies, such as robbery, assault, and manslaughter beyond a
reasonable doubt. After the jury convicted the defendants, the judge was
allowed to extend their sentence within the statutory range set for each of the
felonies, if the court found by a preponderance of the evidence visible
possession of a firearm." The Court concluded that this sentencing factor
84. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986). McMillan was the first case in
which the Supreme Court recognized the term "sentencing factor." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 485 (2000); see also Knoll & Singer supra note 5, at 1058 (arguing that McMillan was
clearly a major turning point in American criminal procedure and defendant's rights cases).
85. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86. The Court found the statute in McMillan was controlled by
Patterson, rather than Mullaney because "'[tihe applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard ...
has always been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given case."'
Id. at 85 (alteration in original) (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 211 n.12). The Court reiterated the
holding of Patterson that "'dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of
the Federal Government' and therefore the Court will not intrude unless a fundamental principle of
justice is offended. Id. (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201).
86. Id. at 86.
87. See id. at 86-91; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 242-43 (1998)
(listing the McMillan factors).
88. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81 n.1, 82 & n.2.
89. Id. at 81. If the judge finds visible possession of a firearm, the mandatory minimum sentence
is at least five years imprisonment. Id. at 81-82. However, this scheme is constitutional because the
statute "operates to divest the judge of discretion to impose any sentence of less than five years for
the underlying felony; it does not authorize a sentence in excess of that otherwise allowed for that
offense." Id. This holding is consistent with Patterson because in that case, the Court "rejected the
claim that whenever a State links the 'severity of punishment' to 'the presence or absence of [sic] an
identified fact' the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 84 (quoting
scheme was constitutional because: (1) "the [statute] plainly d[id] not
transgress the limits expressly set out in Patterson.... [T]he Due Process
Clause precludes States from. . . 'declar[ing] an individual guilty or
presumptively guilty of a crime.""° (2) The situation was not like Mullaney,
where "once the State proved the elements which Maine required it to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant faced 'a differential in sentencing
ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence." 9' (3) The statute
did not "alter[] the maximum penalty for the crime committed"92 and it
"operate[d] solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a
penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of
visible possession of a firearm."93 (4) The statute did not "create[] a separate
offense calling for a separate penalty."'  (5) The statute did not permit the
sentencing factor "to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive
offense,"' "but, to the contrary, 'simply [took] one factor that has always
been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment ... and dictated
the precise weight to be given that factor.""
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214).
90. Id. at 86-87 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210). The statute in McMillan created no
presumptions that the defendants committed any of the key facts that comprised the elements of the
crimes. See id. at 87.
91. Id. at 87 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 700 (1975)). In McMillan, the length of
the sentence that a judge could impose if he or she found visible possession of a firearm was
confined within the statutory range for the felonies. See id. at 87-88. Therefore, the sentencing
factor did not go beyond the statutory maximums set for each of the felonies. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 88. The statute only imposed a minimum of five years imprisonment if a firearm was
present, which was within the statutory range for each of the felonies regardless of finding visible
possession of a firearm. See id. For example, someone who commits rape could be sentenced from
one year to a maximum of twenty years. See id. at 87. The mandatory minimum of five years if a
firearm was present was within the maximum range of twenty years. See id.
94. Id. at 88.
95. Id. The "tail" is the sentencing factor, and the "dog" is the substantive offense. Knoll &
Singer, supra note 5, at 1058. Thus, the sentencing factor cannot be one of the key facts required to
prove the substantive offense, e.g., rape, robbery, etc. See id. Furthermore, the sentencing factor
cannot expose the defendant to a sentence that is greater than the statutory maximum of rape,
robbery, etc. See id.
96. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998) (alteration in original)
(quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-90). The Court was deferential to state programs and found that
historically, possession of a firearm had not required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 90.
However, the dissent in McMillan argued that the notion of a sentencing factor was
unconstitutional and controversial because any fact that stigmatizes the defendant and gives rise to a
special punishment should be considered an element of the crime. Id. at 103 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For the dissent it was irrelevant that the five-year mandatory minimum was within the
statutory maximum range for assault. See id. at 103-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The result of the
sentencing factor was still an increase in the defendant's punishment (because the defendant could
no longer be sentenced to less than five years) and there is greater stigma attached when one is found
to have possessed a gun. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore, the dissent found that
McMillan went directly against the holdings in Winship and Mullaney. See id. at 102-03 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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D. Almendarez-Torres v. United States: The Court Applies the McMillan
Five-Factor Test to Uphold Recidivism as a Sentencing Factor, Even
Though it Increases the Defendant's Sentence Beyond the Statutory
Maximum
After McMillan, the question remained open whether the sentencing
scheme had to satisfy all five factors.97 This question was answered in
another controversial 5-4 decision, in Almendarez-Torres, where the Court
continued to take a lenient stance towards the legislature's definition of what
facts could be used as sentencing factors.98 In Almendarez-Torres, the Court
broadened McMillan by holding that all the factors need not be met because
even if a sentencing factor greatly lengthens the statutory penalty, it is still
constitutional for a judge to determine the presence of this fact.9
In Almendarez-Torres, the defendant was indicted for illegally
reentering the United States."w Under the federal statute, normally an illegal
alien who reentered the United States could only be sentenced up to two
years imprisonment, but if the judge concluded by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant had previously been deported for committing
felonies, then he could be imprisoned up to twenty years for recidivism.''
The accused admitted he had previously been convicted and deported for
felonious crimes.)°2 However, the defendant claimed he could only be
sentenced for two years because the indictment did not state that recidivism
was an element of the crime.' 3 Thus, the Court addressed the issue of
97. The majority in McMillan acknowledged that the factor test meant that whether a statute was
constitutional would "depend on differences of degree" and thus, it was unclear which factors must
be met. Id. at 91.
98. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228 (finding that defining which facts make up the
elements of a crime and those that are merely sentencing factors is "normally a matter for
Congress"). Justice Breyer was joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas,
J.. Id. at 226. The dissent was written by Scalia, J., and joined by Stevens, J., Souter, J., and
Ginsburg, J.. Id. This is an interesting alignment of the Court because it presents the competing
analytical frameworks of statutory construction: Justice Breyer's contextualism and Scalia's
textualism. Roberta Sue Alexander, Note, Dueling Views of Statutory Interpretation and the Canon
of Constitutional Doubt: Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), 24 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 375, 377 (1999).
99. Knoll & Singer, supra note 5, at 1059; see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 268
(1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that in Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247, the Court
rejected the notion that "'any significant increase in a statutory maximum sentence would trigger a
constitutional 'elements' requirement').
100. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227. The statutory maximum for an alien who had
previously committed felonies was twenty years. Id.
101. Id. at 226.
102. Id. at 227.
103. Id.
whether recidivism was a separate crime, or an element of the crime, or
simply a sentencing factor. °
The Court began answering this question by looking at the "statute's
language, structure, subject matter, context, and history-factors that typically
help courts determine a statute's objectives and thereby illuminate its text."'"°
Next, the Court addressed the impact of Winship on sentencing factors, °6
Justice Breyer quickly dismissed this consideration and explained that
Winship did not decide this case because it simply stands for the proposition
that every element of a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Winship says nothing about "whether, or when, the Constitution requires the
Government to treat a particular fact as an element ....""'
Shortly thereafter, the Court concluded Mullaney did lend the petitioner
a stronger argument in his favor."°  The Court focused on Mullaney's
holding that states may not just redefine the "'elements that constitut[e]
different crimes, [by] characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the
extent of punishment.""'" Surprisingly, the Court conceded that if "[r]ead
literally, this language .... suggests that Congress cannot permit judges to
increase a sentence in light of recidivism, or any other [sentencing] factor,
not set forth in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.""' Furthermore, read textually, Mullaney's language means that "the
Constitution requires that most, if not all, sentencing factors be treated as
elements,""' 2 however, "Patterson suggests the exact opposite, namely, that
the Constitution requires scarcely any sentencing factors to be treated in that
way."" 3
Although the Court recognizes strong tension between Mullaney and
Patterson, the Court is able to reconcile them by concluding "these cases,
taken together, [stand] for the broad proposition that sometimes the
Constitution does require (though sometimes it does not require) the State to
treat a sentencing factor as an element.""'  Clearly, the Court accepts
sentencing factors in general as constitutional, and recognizes that Winship,
104. Id. at 226, 228.
105. Id. at 228. The Court analyzed in detail the statutory text and legislative history and
concluded that Congress clearly intended for recidivism to be a sentencing factor. See id. at 229-34.
106. See id, at 239-40.
107. Id. at 239-40.
108. Id. at 240.
109. See id. at 240.
110. Id. at 240 (quoting Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698); see also supra notes 59-72 and
accompanying text.
111. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 240.
112. Id. at 241.
113. Id. The Court cited Patterson for the rule that although the severity of punishment may be
linked to the "'presence or absence of an identified fact,"' this alone does "not automatically make
the fact an 'element."' Id. at 242 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84 (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at
214)).
114. Id.
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Mullaney, and Patterson do not really provide any standard by which to
judge whether the sentencing factor is actually an element of the crime that
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."5 Therefore, it is necessary to
subject the sentencing factor to the five-factor balancing test in McMillan
and determine whether the sentencing factor is more like an element of the
crime."'
The Court listed the five factors and concluded that the statute in
Almendarez-Torres meets all of the factors except for the third one because
"it does 'alte[r] the maximum penalty for the crime,' and it also creates a
wider range of appropriate punishments" than the statute in McMillan."
7
However, the Court found this did not render the statute unconstitutional
because it met four out of the five factors in McMillan."8 First, the Court
recognized that the sentencing factor, recidivism, "is a traditional, if not the
most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's
sentence.""'  Second, the Court found that although the statute in
Almendarez-Torres did not set a mandatory minimum (like the statute in
McMillan) and instead triggered an increase in the maximum sentence,'20 this
did not disadvantage the defendant.'2 ' Third, the statute's broad sentencing
range of twenty years did not alone "create significantly greater unfairness"
because "[j]udges (and parole boards) have typically exercised their
discretion within broad statutory ranges."'22 Lastly, the statute did not
"change a pre-existing definition of a well-established crime, nor is there
any.., reason.., to think Congress intended to 'evade' the Constitution,
115. See id.
116. See id. at 242-43.
117. Id. at 243 (alteration in original) (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87).
118. See id.
119. Id. (finding recidivism laws date back to colonial times, and that currently recidivism laws
exist in all fifty states).
120. Id. at 244. An increase in the maximum sentence occurs because normally, without
recidivism the defendant can only be sentenced to two years maximum. Id. at 229-30, 244.
However, if the court determines the defendant was previously convicted of a felony, the maximum
sentence available is now increased to twenty years. Id.
121. Id. at 244. An increase in the maximum sentence actually works to the defendant's benefit.
See id. For example, when the maximum is increased, the court is free to give the defendant
anywhere from one to twenty years in prison, whereas with a mandatory minimum, the judge must
sentence the defendant to at least five years in prison. See id. at 244-45. Furthermore, the risks of
unfair results are higher with a mandatory minimum than with a permissive maximum because the
judge has less discretion in choosing the length of sentence. See id. at 245.
122. Id. The Court noted that it is constitutional for judges to determine facts that impose even
more severe punishments than the one at issue in Almendarez-Torres. Id. at 247. For instance,
judges can find the existence of facts that decide whether the defendant should be sentenced to death
or life in prison. Id.
either by 'presuming' guilt or 'restructuring' the elements of an offense."'23
Therefore, the Court held that the sentencing factor recidivism is not an
element of the crime, and implied other sentencing factors, which increase a
defendant's penalty beyond the statutory maximum, could also be
constitutional. 
24
E. Jones v. United States: The Court Foreshadows its Holding in Apprendi
By Indicating that Factors Used to Extend Punishment Beyond the
Statutory Maximum Are Generally Unconstitutional
Exactly one year later, Justice Souter wrote for the 5-4 majority in Jones
v. United States," and limited the holding in Almendarez-Torres to instances
where recidivism is used as a sentencing factor. 26 In Jones, the defendant
was found guilty of carjacking and faced a statutory maximum of fifteen
years in prison for this crime.'27 However, if a judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted with the intent to do
serious bodily harm to the victims or cause death, the sentence could be
enhanced to a statutory maximum of twenty-five years in prison.'28 The
defendant argued that intent to do serious bodily harm was really an element
of the crime, rather than a sentencing factor.'29
As in Almendarez-Torres and McMillan,"° the Court began its analysis
by asking whether Congress intended for intent to do serious bodily harm to
be a sentencing factor or an element of the offense.'' The Court found it
was questionable what Congress had intended, and that it was uncertain that
the "steeply higher penalties" faced for acting with the intent to injure or
cause death were meant to be determined without the beyond a reasonable
doubt safeguard."2 Based on this analysis, the Court determined that the
statute's text was an unreliable guide.'33 Next, following the methodology
used in Almendarez-Torres, the Court looked at historical practice to see
123. Id. at 246 (comparing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-87, 89-90).
124. See id. at 246-47. The Court acknowledged that it expressed no opinion in Almendarez-
Torres whether a higher level of proof might be required in other instances where finding the
existence of particular conduct significantly increases the severity of sentence. Id. at 248.
125. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999). Justice Souter was joined by Stevens, J.,
Scalia, J., Thomas, J., and Ginsburg, J.. Id. The dissent was written by Kennedy, J., and joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., and Breyer, J.. Id.
126. See generally id. at 235-44 (discussing how historically the factor "serious bodily injury" is
an element of the crime and that only recidivism has been allowed to increase a penalty beyond the
statutory maximum).
127. Id. at 230.
128. Id. at230-31.
129. Id. at 231.
130. See notes 84-124 and accompanying text.
131. Jones, 526 U.S. at 232-33.
132. Id. at 233.
133. Id.
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whether intent to commit bodily harm or cause death had traditionally been
used as a sentencing factor, like recidivism.'34 In Jones, the Court found that
historically intent to cause harm or death had been an element in aggravated
offenses, and thus it was likely that Congress intended for this factor to be a
separate offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'35
The Court then analyzed Winship, Mullaney, Patterson, and McMillan
in order to determine whether intent to cause harm or death was a sentencing
factor.'36 First, Justice Souter noted that Winship and Mullaney directly went
against finding for the Government because malice and intent have been an
essential element of crimes since early common law, and hence must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'37 Based on Mullaney, states and
Congress may not simply get around Winship by redefining elements of a
crime as sentencing factors.'
Next, the Court assessed the holding of Patterson.'39 It concluded that
while a narrow reading of Patterson might only mean that states may not
presume elements of crimes, Patterson actually stands for the broader rule
that states are limited in how they can reallocate traditional burdens of
proof.' °  Patterson means that states "lac[k] the discretion to omit
'traditional' elements from the definition of crimes" and cannot "require the
accused to disprove such elements.,''
Third, although the Court did not use the five-factor McMillan test, it
did focus on whether, in light of McMillan, the accused is entitled to a jury
trial and beyond a reasonable doubt standard when a sentencing factor is
used to greatly increase the severity of the crime.' The Court looked at the
Sixth Amendment and historical case law to determine which facts should
go to a jury.'43 Rather than risk diminishing the role of the jury, the Court
concluded that facts that greatly increase an accused's sentence should not
134. Id. at 234-35.
135. Id. at 235. The Court noted that carjacking is a form of robbery and that intent to cause harm
or death has historically been an element of aggravated robbery. Id. Furthermore, even if Congress
meant for serious bodily harm to be construed as a sentencing factor, the Court relied on the
principle that "where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and
doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our
duty is to adopt the latter." Id. at 239 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 240-42.
137. Id. at 240-41.
138. Id. at 241 (citing Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698).
139. Id. at 241-43.
140. Id. at 243.
141. Id. at 241-42.
142. Id. at 242-44.
143. Id. at 242-48.
go to a judge.'" Lastly, Justice Souter decided that although read broadly
Almendarez-Torres' holding means that, "not every fact expanding a penalty
range must be stated in a felony indictment ...... " it should be limited as an
exception that applies only when recidivism is a sentencing factor.' 5
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 22, 1994, at 2:04 a.m., Charles C. Apprendi fired eight
.22 caliber rifle shots into the home of Michael and Mattie Fowlkes and their
three children."6 Bullets shattered the glass pane of the front door, and broke
windows, with one of the bullets lodging in their daughter's bedroom."7 He
also used two black Santa Claus decorations hanging on the door as
targets."8 The Fowlkes were the only African-Americans living in an all-
white neighborhood, in Vineland, New Jersey." 9  Twenty minutes later,
Apprendi was arrested and immediately confessed that he had fired the
shots.'50 After approximately three hours of intense interrogation, from 3:05
a.m. until 6:04 a.m.,"' he admitted that "'he does not know the.., victims or
the family, but because they are black in color he does not want them in the
144. Id. at 248.
145. Id. at 248-49 (finding that there is an exception for recidivism because it is one of the most
traditional sentencing factors).
146. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 469 (2000); see also Melanie Burney, Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt? Court to Consider Whether Judge Should Have Added Punishment, ABC
NEWS.COM (Mar. 28, 2000), at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/scotus
_hatcrimes000328.html; New Jersey v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 486 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 530 U.S.
466 (2000); Resp't Brief at 5, available at LEXIS 1999 U.S. Briefs 478; infra note 382 (giving
details about the impact Apprendi's crimes had on Mattie and her family. Mattie subsequently
divorced Michael and currently goes by her maiden name, Harrell).
Apprendi and the Fowlkes were neighbors. New Jersey v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265, 1266
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), rev'd, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). On two other occasions in 1994,
Apprendi fired a rifle at the Fowlkes' house. Id. The first incident occurred on September 24, 1994,
where Apprendi shot at the bedroom of one of the children. Id.; see also Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 486.
On the second occasion, in November 1994, shots were fired at the exterior of the house. Apprendi,
698 A.2d at 1266; see also 731 A.2d at 486.
147. Resp't Brief at 5.
148. Id. at 3.
149. Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 486.
150. Christopher Mumma, N.J. Law On Hate Crimes Squashed Juries, Not Judges, Should Have
Power, REC. N. N.J., June 27, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 15820550; see also Pet. Brief at 6,
available at LEXIS 1999 U.S. Briefs 478 (stating Apprendi confessed to firing approximately four
or five rounds at the house).
151. See Pet. Brief at 6-7; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. Apprendi maintained that:
[T]he interrogating officer first mentioned race during the interrogation and that he gave
a false confession to the officer because he was irrational and scared. He testified that the
interrogating officer tried to intimidate him by telling him that there were "a lot of
homosexuals and AIDS in jail" and a large prison population of blacks who would assault
him when they discovered the nature of his crime. Petitioner testified that the officer
promised that if he (Apprendi) cooperated, the officer would try to make it easier on him.
As to the shooting, Mr. Apprendi testified that he fired at his neighbors' front door
because the glass and purple door attracted his attention, sparking an urge to destroy it.
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neighborhood. ... """ Apprendi further stated that he knew they were
black, hoped to frighten them into moving,'53 and that he wanted to "'just
giv[e] them a message that they were in his neighborhood."' 5  However,
Apprendi later recanted his statement and said he lied to the police because
he was mentally disturbed, scared, and irritated.'" While staying in a
halfway house in Camden, New Jersey, waiting for the Supreme Court to
hear his appeal, he reflected that, "'[ilt was just criminal mischief. That's all
it was. I had no idea it was a black family's home.... In a rational state of
mind and unimpaired I would have never thought of shooting in someone's
house."" 6 Throughout the trial, Apprendi, a pharmacist, maintained that he
shot at the Fowlkes' front door because the "'glass and the purple door"'
caught his eye, while under the influence of drugs and mental disorders.' 7
A grand jury indicted Apprendi and the defendant entered into a plea
agreement with the prosecution,' 8 where he pled guilty to two second-degree
counts (three and eighteen) for possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose and on one third-degree count (twenty-two) for possession of an
antipersonnel bomb.' 9 Under the second-degree counts, Apprendi could be
sentenced between five to ten years, and the third-degree count of three to
five years would run concurrently with the second-degree penalty."
However, the State of New Jersey reserved the right under its hate crime
statute to enhance the second-degree statutory maximum of ten years, if the
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi committed
Pet. Brief at 7 (citations omitted).
152. Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 486 (alteration in original).
153. Daniel M. Levy, Hate Crime Laws: Cure or Placebo?, 79 MICH. B. J. 674, 678 (2000).
154. Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 486.
155. Apprendi, 698 A.2d at 1267. A psychologist testified that Apprendi suffered from
cyclothymic disorder (excessive mood swings), obsessive-compulsive disorder, kleptomania, drug
dependence, alcohol abuse, and premature ejaculation. Id. The psychologist concluded that a person
with this personality type would "say or do almost anything, including lie, to get out of a police
interrogation." Id. Apprendi testified that he lied to the police because they were threatening him
and he just wanted to get away from the interrogation. Id.
156. Melanie Burney, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Court to Consider Whether Judge Should
Have Added Punishment, ABC NEWS.COM (Mar. 28, 2000), at http://www.abcnews.go.com
/sections/us /DailyNews/scotushatecrimes000328.html.
157. Apprendi, 698 A.2d at 1267.
158. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469 (finding that the grand jury originally indicted Apprendi on
twenty-three counts, and none of them mentioned the hate crime statute or that Apprendi was
racially biased).
159. Id.
160. Id. Apprendi was sentenced on count eighteen to twelve years imprisonment, with four years
of parole ineligibility, on count three to a concurrent term of seven years in jail, and on count
twenty-two to a concurrent sentence of three years. Apprendi, 698 A.2d at 1267. Additionally,
Apprendi had to pay $1,980 to the victim, $100 to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board and a
penalty of $75 under the Safe Street Act. Id.
the crime with a biased purpose. 6 ' Thus, if the judge found Apprendi guilty
of a hate crime by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant could be
subjected to a maximum penalty of twenty years instead of just ten years
imprisonment.'6
In order to prove the absence of hate in the defendant's heart, the
defense lawyer brought in evidence of Apprendi's close personal
associations. '63 He introduced affidavits under oath of several African-
Americans who had known Apprendi for three years, and all the way "'back
to when he was a baby.""'  These witnesses swore they had been in the
family home and socialized with Apprendi on numerous occasions and had
never seen any racially biased behavior.'65 The group regularly went
bowling together, got drinks and food afterwards, and Apprendi invited one
of the men to his house for Super Bowl parties." 6 Apprendi took the stand
and testified, "'my 40 years of life is my proof that racism is not a part of my
life. I've interacted with - with black people, Puerto Rican people. You
know, anything, everybody. I have never had a problem." 67
Despite testimony from personal friends who had known Apprendi his
whole life, the sentencing judge thought he was in the best position to
determine whether the act of shooting was motivated by racial hate.'66 The
judge by himself concluded there was racial bias by a mere preponderance
of the evidence, and extended Apprendi's jail sentence beyond the statutory
maximum he could have received had there been no hate crime.' 69
Ultimately, the judge concluded Apprendi had acted with biased hatred and
161. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70. Historically, "New Jersey was one of the first states to adopt a
hate crime law, in 1981. It bans acts of racial or ethnic intimidations, such as burning crosses or
painting swastikas." Supreme Court to Hear Arguments on Hate Crimes New Jersey Man Claims
Law Unconstitutional, CNN.com, March 27, 2000, at http://wwwcnn.com/2000/US/03/27
/scotus.hate.02/index.html. New Jersey expanded its law in 1990 to provide harsher penalties in
assault and harassment crimes if prejudice played a role in picking the victim. Id.
162. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70.
163. Corry, supra note 15, at 482.
164. Id. (quoting Transcript of Motion and Sentencing at 44-45, Apprendi (No. 99-478).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 483 (quoting Transcript of Motion and Sentencing at 66, Apprendi (No. 99-478).
168. id. The Honorable Rushton H. Ridgeway stated that Apprendi acted with the mental intent
of racial hate because:
[P]ersons who have racial bias don't wear that bias as a badge of honor. I mean, the
remarks that people make of that nature - those remarks are protected by the First
Amendment - usually are done behind closed doors. And people just don't take action on
those [sic] bias. So that these people who submit these letters don't know obviously,
what has gone on in the mind of the defendant.
Id. (alteration in original). Furthermore, the judge "'had difficulty believing that [petitioner] was
attracted to [the Fowlkes' front] door by the color. And that something went off in his...
intoxicated state of mind that he wanted to destroy the door."' Resp't Brief at 7 (alteration in
original).
169. Corry, supra note 15, at 483-84.
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sentenced him to twelve years imprisonment, which was two years beyond
the statutory maximum on count eighteen.'70
IV. THE COURT OPINIONS
A. Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion: The Court Rejects the Use of the
McMillan Five-Factor Test and Concludes that any Fact, other than
Recidivism, that Increases a Sentence Beyond the Statutory Maximum is
an Element of the Crime'
Since the Supreme Court's decision in In re Winship,'" the Court has
struggled with "analytical tensions" in criminal sentencing.'73 This struggle
involves balancing the principles of Mullaney and Winship with those of
Patterson and McMillan in order to determine whether a fact is an element
of the crime or a sentencing factor.' 4  On the one hand the Court has
"rejected the claim that whenever a State links the 'severity of punishment'
to 'the presence or absence of an identified fact' the State must prove that
fact beyond a reasonable doubt,"'75 but on the other hand has endorsed the
proposition that "[t]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against
170. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
171. The majority opinion in Apprendi was written by Justice John Paul Stevens, who is perhaps
the most liberal member of the Court. Frank J. Murray, Supreme Court: Only Jury May Decide
Crime Was Motivated By Hatred, WASH. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at A13; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 468. He was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, "a quartet rarely in agreement on any 5-4 split." Murray, supra at A13; see also
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468. A similar split in the Court was seen in Jones and Almendarez-Torres.
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226 (1998); see also Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 229 (1999). In Jones and Apprendi, the "razor slim" majority vote was possible because
Justice Thomas was the swing vote. See Knoll & Singer, supra note 5, at 1118.
172. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
173. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474. There is tension in the criminal judicial system because while it
is important to limit the judge's discretion in order to protect the defendant's ights, judges have
historically had wide discretion to determine the appropriate sentence for a convicted defendant. See
Benjamin J. Priester, Note, Further Developments on Previous Symposia: Sentenced for a "Crime"
the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the Constitutional Limitations on
Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather Than Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. Autumn 1998 No. 4, at 249, 251. Priester found that although these tensions are unresolved,
Jones indicated that the trend is towards protecting criminal defendants and using the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. See id. at 249, 297-98.
174. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474; see also Knoll & Singer, supra note 5, at 1058-61 (noting that
twelve years after In re Winship there has been a revolutionary change in the way facts are used to
sentence defendants and the Court needs to clarify the limits).
175. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214).
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."'76
On June 26, 2000, the Supreme Court attempted to better define the
constitutional boundaries for sentencing factors in Apprendi v. New Jersey
and reinforce criminal rights by holding that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."'77 Justice Stevens held that determining the
existence of hate motive is an element of the crime and must be proven by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt whenever it is used to extend a defendant's
sentence beyond the statutory maximum.'78 The Court also concluded that
any sentencing factor that extends the penalty beyond the statutory
maximum is really an element of the crime, and therefore must be submitted
to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt standard.'79
The holding is well supported, because the majority relies heavily on a
detailed historical analysis that begins in the 1700s and ends with the
Court's decision in Jones.'80 History demonstrates that the length of
sentence may not be extended beyond the statutory maximum merely upon a
judicial finding of fact based upon a preponderance of the evidence.'8'
Justice Stevens observed that although judges have wide discretion in
sentencing convicted defendants, this discretion has historically been limited
within a range proscribed by statute.'82 This observation is reinforced by the
notion that since Winship, the Court has "made clear beyond peradventure
that Winship's due process and associated jury protections extend, to some
degree, 'to determinations that [go] not to a defendant's guilt or innocence,
but simply to the length of his sentence."" 83 Thus, the judge's discretion is
176. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
177. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. The Court noted that just last year in Jones, it had "serious doubt
concerning the constitutionality of allowing penalty-enhancing findings to be determined by a judge
by a preponderance of the evidence . I..." d. at 472. "Apprendi for the first time specifically
applied the principles recognized in Jones and Almendarez-Torres to state prosecutions." People v.
Lathon, 740 N.E.2d 377, 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77).
178. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 493-94 & n.19.
179. Id. at494&n.19.
180. See id, at 476-84.
181. See id. Justice Stevens found the principle that a trial by jury should be used to prove every
accusation beyond a reasonable doubt has been a part of the common law for many centuries. Id. at
477 (citing 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th
ed. 1873); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769); C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 321, pp. 681-82 (1954)).
182. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83. Justice Stevens quoted KATE STITH & JoSt A.
CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9 (1998), which
is cited in the dissent, for the proposition that "'[flrom the beginning of the Republic, federal judges
were entrusted with wide sentencing discretion . . . , permitting the sentencing judge to impose any
term of imprisonment and any fine up to the statutory maximum."' Id. at 482 n.9.
183. Id. at 484 (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The
majority noted that this was the essential lesson to be drawn from Mulaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
697-98 (1975). Id. at 485. Mullaney stands for the proposition that a state cannot circumvent the
750
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bound by the key facts (elements) found beyond a reasonable doubt by the
jury, and the judge may not extend the sentence beyond the statutory
maximum."
The Court primarily used the historical analysis section to examine its
most important cases dealing with standards of proof in a criminal trial
which includes: Winship,'85  Mullaney, 6  Patterson,7  McMillan,'88
Almendarez-Torres,'89 and Jones.9 ' After synthesizing these holdings, it
appeared that the Court has never "budge[d] from the position that (1)
constitutional limits exist to States' authority to define away facts necessary
to constitute a criminal offense, and (2) that a state scheme that keeps from
the jury facts that 'expos[e] [defendants] to greater or additional
punishment,' may raise serious constitutional concern."'' The Court
explained,
[i]n sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the
history upon which they rely, confirms the opinion that we
expressed in Jones. Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any
beyond a reasonable doubt requirements of Winship "merely by 'redefin[ing] the elements"' of a
crime as sentencing factors. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
697-98). The majority rebutted the dissent's notion that Patterson v. New York limited this aspect of
Mullaney. Id. at 485 n.12. Although Patterson provided the legislature with discretion in defining
the elements of crimes, the Court made clear that states may not reallocate burdens of proof merely
by labeling an element a sentencing factor. Id.
184. See id. at 482-84 (determining Winship was the first time beyond a reasonable doubt was
actually held to be the proper standard, and that Winship solidified this standard as a requirement in
our criminal justice system).
185. See id. at 483; see also supra notes 29-58 and accompanying text.
186. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483-84; see also supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
187. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484-85; see also supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
188. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485-86; see also supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
189. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485-87; see also supra notes 97-124 and accompanying text.
190. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487-88; see also supra notes 125-145 and accompanying text.
191. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. 79, 85-88 (1986)). A common
thread throughout all of these cases with the limited exception of AImendarez-Torres, is that the
judge has always increased the defendant's sentence within the statutory maximum. See id. at 487-
88. In Almendarez-Torres, the Court found it was constitutional for the judge to extend the
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on a finding of the fact of recidivism. Id.
at 488. However, the holding in Jones made it "crystal clear" that the conclusion in Almendarez-
Torres "turned heavily upon the fact that" recidivism is one of the most traditional basis for
increasing an offender's sentence, and the defendant actually admitted he had committed the
previous crimes. Id. at 488. The majority countered the dissent's argument that Almendarez-Torres
is proof that judges should be allowed to extend sentences beyond the statutory range by stating that
the case "simply cannot bear [the dissent's] broad reading" and is limited to cases involving
recidivism. Id. at 488 n. 14, 533-35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing AImendarez-Torres is not an
exception, and in Almendarez-Torres the Court held that judges may extend the sentence beyond the
statutory maximum).
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. 92
Additionally, "[i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the
jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts
must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."'9 3 This rule is
narrowly interpreted in Apprendi because it is only applied to a statute that
extended the sentence beyond the statutory maximum.'94  Therefore,
sentencing factors are constitutional and may be found by a judge by a
preponderance of the evidence when they affect the defendant's length of
conviction within the stated statutory range.95
Next, the majority clarified when it is appropriate to use the McMillan
five-factor test to determine if the state's sentencing scheme is
192. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 481-82. The majority quickly dismissed the dissent's accusation that its holding
has the broad effect of invalidating the current capital punishment and federal Sentencing Guideline
procedures. See id. at 497 & n.21. But cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 535-52, 539-52 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing strongly that the majority has invalidated the capital punishment system and
federal Sentencing Guidelines).
However, the majority narrowly construed its holding and found it is still constitutional for
judges to use sentencing factors and determine whether a defendant is to receive the death penalty or
a life sentence. See id at 495-97. Justice Stevens, approved of this capital punishment procedure
because he concluded that,
[w]hat the cited cases hold is that, once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the
elements of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it
may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser
one, ought to be imposed.... The person who is charged with actions that expose him to
the death penalty has an absolute entitlement to jury trial on all the elements of the
charge.
Id. at 497 (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 244, 257 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis deleted)). Therefore, it is constitutional for the judge to impose the death penalty because
the jury made the initial findings that will expose the defendant to the death penalty beyond a
reasonable doubt. See id. Furthermore, the capital punishment system is constitutional because the
judge is still operating within the statutory range, i.e., the judge can impose any sentence ranging
from life imprisonment to the death penalty. See id. Additionally, Justice Stevens dismissed the
argument that the majority had overruled the federal Sentencing Guidelines because the Guidelines
were not before the Court and hence, no view was expressed on the subject. Id. at 497 n.2 1.
195. See id. at 481-82. Justice Stevens upheld sentencing factors in general because he stated that,
nothing ... suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion - taking into
consideration various factors relating both to the offense and offender - in imposing a
judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We have often noted that judges in this
country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within
statutory limits ....
Id. But cf Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 533 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority in effect
has declared all sentencing factors to be unconstitutional because the majority stated it is
unconstitutional to remove from the jury facts "'that increase the prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed.' (quotation omitted)).
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unconstitutional.'" The McMillan five-factor test cannot be used when the
judge extends a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, and thus,
McMillan may only be applied when a judge is extending the conviction
within the stated statutory range.'97 Because the judge in Apprendi increased
the defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum, the McMillan test
was not used to determine whether hate motive was an element or
sentencing factor.98 In cases where the sentence is extended beyond the
statutory maximum, the proper test is, "does the required finding expose the
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty
verdict?""' If it does, then the fact being used to extend the defendant's
conviction beyond the statutory maximum is an element of a crime that must
be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.2" Therefore, a sentencing
factor is a fact that lengthens or mitigates a conviction within the statutory
range, while any fact that increases the conviction beyond the statutory
maximum is an element of a crime."'
Based on the Court's new test, the hate motive factor was held to be an
element of a crime for two main reasons.2 First, the hate motive is really an
element of a crime because it was a fact that extended the defendant's
conviction beyond the statutory maximum."' Second, determining the
presence of a "'purpose to intimidate' on account of, inter alia, race" goes to
196. See id. at 530 U.S. at 487 n. 13. The sentencing scheme is unconstitutional when the state has
taken an element of the crime that should be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and defined
it as a sentencing factor that is determined by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at
484-488. Typically, the McMillan test is used to determine whether the fact used to extend the
defendant's penalty is a sentencing factor or an element of the crime. See id.
197. See id. Although the dissent accused the majority of overruling McMillan, the majority
stated that it merely limited the case to instances that "do not involve the imposition of a sentence
more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict - a
limitation identified in the McMillan opinion itself." Id. at 487 n.13. The dissent argued that the
McMillan five-factor test should be applied to determine whether a fact is an element or sentencing
factor regardless of whether that fact is used to extend the penalty beyond the statutory maximum.
See id. at 532-33, 551-53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "increase in the maximum
penalty" rule that limited the use of the McMillan test was not required by the Constitution and
should be rejected).
198. Id. at 494 & n.19 (finding that New Jersey's reliance on McMillan was misplaced and
therefore, New Jersey could not use the McMillan test to determine whether hate motive was an
element or sentencing factor).
199. Id. When a factor is used to extend the conviction beyond the statutory maximum, the
McMillan five-factor test is not used. See id. Instead, one must ask what is the effect of the factor.
Id. at 494. If the factor extends the conviction beyond the statutory maximum, than its effect is
elemental in nature. Id. at 494 & n.19.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
203. Id. at494&n.19.
the defendant's mens rea which is a clear-cut example of an element of a
crime. ' Thus, the hate crime factor must be found by a jury of one's peers
and established beyond a reasonable doubt if it increases the punishment
beyond the statutory maximum."
Essentially, these two conclusions mean that the Court held "it violates
due process and the Sixth Amendment to convict a person of one crime, but
punish him or her for another. ' ' "° "Apprendi was convicted of possession of
a firearm for an unlawful purpose, but he was sentenced both for this crime
and for the separate offense of having acted with an impermissible hate-
based motive. ' '  In essence, the hate motive factor was a separate crime
that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 Therefore, any
factor that extends the defendant's conviction beyond the statutory
maximum will be found to be a separate offense or an element of a crime.'
B. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion: The Dissent is Overly Idealistic to
Believe a Judge Can Accurately Find Facts by a Preponderance of the
Evidence in all Situations
Justice Scalia wrote a short opinion and criticized the dissent for
thinking that a governmental bureaucracy is capable of "perfect equity"
when determining the proper sentence for a defendant." ' The criminal
204. Id. at 492-93. The Court concluded that establishing a defendant's conscious objective was
to intimidate a victim due to their race or other status-based characteristics is really an element of a
crime because the defendant's state of mind must be closely examined. Id. at 493 & n.17. Acting
with a hateful purpose goes to the defendant's mens rea or "criminal intent," which requires an
examination of that person's mental state. id.; see also supra note 15 (commenting it is a difficult
and complex endeavor to prove existence of hatred); but cf. infra note 256 (noting the Court in
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993), upheld hate motive as a sentencing factor). The
Apprendi majority found that "Wisconsin's hate crime statute [in Mitchell], was in text and
substance, different from New Jersey's .... " Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 493 n. 18. Also, Mitchell never
addressed whether Wisconsin's hate crime requirement was an element or sentencing factor. Id.
Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court's characterization of the particular hate crime statute in
Apprendi as a sentencing factor going to the defendant's motive, rather than a mens rea element,
could not "change the nature of the conduct actually targeted" by the statute. Id. The Court
concluded that the New Jersey statute used the language "'purpose to intimidate,"' and that this
language "[b]y its very terms ... mandate[d] an examination of the defendant's state of mind ......
Id. at 492.
205. Id. at 494.
206. Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 520.
207. Id. at 520-21
208. Id. at 521
209. Id.
210. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia criticized Justice Breyer's
dissent. Id. He believes Justice Breyer describes a criminal system that is totally run by judges,
which contradicts the system envisioned by the Founding Fathers of the American Republic. Id. at
499. The founders sought to leave criminal justice to the people in the form of juries. Id.
Furthermore, they were in agreement on this point because the guaranteed right to a jury-trial "was
one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights." Id.
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justice system should appear fair to the American people, which means that
"the criminal will never get more punishment than he bargained for when he
did the crime, and his guilt of the crime (and hence the length of the
sentence to which he is exposed) will be determined beyond a reasonable
doubt by the unanimous vote of 12 of his fellow citizens.""' The dissent's
opinion "proceed[ed] on the erroneous and all-too-common assumption that
the Constitution means what we think it ought to mean. It does not; it means
what it says."22 Thus, because the Constitution literally requires due process
of law, this mandates that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt all
facts bearing on punishment.2 3
C. Justice Thomas' Concurrence: The Court Should Adopt an Even Broader
Rule that Makes More Facts Elements of the Crime2"
Justice Thomas defined the issue in Apprendi as the "seemingly simple
question of what constitutes a 'crime.' '2 5  The answer to this question is
found in the way one determines "which facts constitute the 'crime' - that is,
which facts are the 'elements' or 'ingredients' of a crime."2 6  Once
something is found to be a crime, the Constitution guarantees that the
following rights attach:
the "accused" has the right (1) "to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation" (that is, the basis on which he is accused of
a crime), (2) to be "held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime" only on an indictment or presentment of a grand
jury, and (3) to be tried by "an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed."2 7 "Thus it is critical
211. Id. Justice Scalia argued it is unfair to the criminal defendant's and society's expectations to
say that the statutory maximum for a particular crime is thirty years; and then allow a judge to
extend this conviction beyond the stated maximum penalty. Id.
212. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499.
213. Id. The Constitution guarantees that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to... trial, by an impartial jury." Id. This statement "has no intelligible content unless it
means that all the facts which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed
punishment must be found by the jury." Id.
214. Justice Scalia joined Parts I and II of Justice Thomas' concurrence. Id. at 499 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 500.
217. Id. at 499 (quoting U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI).
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to know which facts are elements" of the crime because all of these
constitutional rights attach."'
Justice Thomas noted that the question of which facts are elements
becomes more difficult and complicated to answer after the Court's decision
in McMillan created the idea of the sentencing enhancement (or sentencing
factor).2 9 Although the term "sentencing enhancement" is relatively new,
Courts have long had to ask which facts are elements of the crime and then
answer this question by granting the criminal defendant the aforementioned
constitutional rights.2 This historical practice is crucial, because it
demonstrates there is a "long line of essentially uniform authority...
stretching from the earliest reported cases after the founding until well into
the 20th century" that proves "the original understanding of which facts are
elements was even broader than the rule the. Court adopt[ed]." 22 ' Therefore,
historically, criminal defendants were granted greater constitutional
protection because more facts were considered elements of the crime that
had to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 2
Justice Thomas analyzed much of the same case history used by the
majority and concluded that the McMillan factor analysis should be thrown
out because it has complicated the Court's due process analysis. 223 The five-
factor test should be discontinued and the Court should adopt an even
broader rule than the one adopted by the Apprendi majority. 224 The result of
Justice Thomas' ruling is that more facts will be found to be elements of
crimes."' Justice Thomas urged the Court to adopt the rule that every fact
which increases the length of punishment is an element of the crime,
including recidivism. 6  Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded that the
218. Id. at 500.
219. Id. Facts known as sentencing enhancements increase the defendant's punishment, but are
not subjected to the constitutional protections which elements receive. Id.; see also supra note 37
(describing the different constitutional protections).
220. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 500.
221. Id. at 501.
222. See generally id. at 500-18. Justice Thomas cited numerous historical cases dealing with
larceny, burglary, and recidivism, as well as an 1872 treatise as evidence that traditionally, any fact
that increased punishment was considered an element of the crime. Id. This understanding
continued until the middle of the twentieth century. Id. at 518.
223. See id. at 501-02 (finding "[n]o multi-factor parsing of statutes" is necessary).
224. Id. at 499-503.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 505-07. The Justice found substantial evidence for the rule that "a crime includes every
fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment . I..." Id. at 506. Historically,
courts considered recidivism to be an element of the crime because a crime "includes any fact to
which punishment attaches." Id. at 515-16.
Additionally, for Justice Thomas' broad rule, it is irrelevant "whether a particular fact is
traditionally (or typically) a basis for a sentencing court to increase an offender's sentence." Id. at
520. Justice Thomas admitted this was an error he made in deciding Almendarez-Torres. Id. To
avoid this error, the rule he advocates is - if the fact increases the punishment, it is an element
regardless of whether it has historically been a sentencing enhancement. Id. at 520-22.
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majority's rule, while not as broad as it should be, marks a return to the
original understanding of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.227
D. Justice O'Connor's Dissent22
1. The Court's Rejection of the McMillan Five-Factor Test Represents
a Substantial Change in the Court's Due Process Jurisprudence
Unlike the concurrence and majority that believe Apprendi marks a
return to a traditional understanding of how criminal defendants are
sentenced, Justice O'Connor immediately declared this a "watershed change
in constitutional law., 29 She began her discussion by noting that the Court
"has long recognized that not every fact that bears on a defendant's
punishment need be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proved by the government beyond a reasonable doubt., 23" Rather, the
"legislature's definition of the elements of the offense is usually
dispositive."23" ' Additionally, the Court has never established a bright-line
rule to determine whether a fact is an element. 32 Therefore, the Court should
continue to answer this question by using a case-by-case McMillan five-
factor analysis, regardless of whether the fact is used to increase the
statutory maximum.233
Justice O'Connor believes that the majority misreads the historical cases
and treatises it cited and that this authority does not mandate the majority's
statutory maximum rule."M She divided the majority's case history into two
categories. 35 The first involved evidence that judges at common law had
little discretion in how to sentence defendants and second, that the
227. Id. at 518.
228. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer joined the dissent. Id. at 523
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 524.
230. Id.
231. Id. Justice O'Connor recognized that the states are bound by the constitutional limits set
forth in cases like Winship, and McMillan. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 524-25.
234. Id. at 525-26. She quoted Justice Stevens' rule and set forth the majority's rule that "'[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Id. at 525. Justice O'Connor countered that the majority could not "identify a single instance" since
the ratification of the Bill of Rights over two hundred years ago that mandated adoption of this rule.
Id.
235. Id.
government must prove at trial all the elements of a crime.236 Justice
O'Connor dismissed these findings because in the first category, the
majority itself actually rejected the relevance of this historical practice
because of conflicting evidence that judges in America have had wide
discretion in sentencing defendants. 37  As to the second category of
evidence, this says nothing about whether a fact that extends a defendant's
punishment beyond the statutory maximum should be treated as an element
of the crime.238  For Justice O'Connor, the real issue in Apprendi
"concern[ed] the distinct question of when a fact that bears on a defendant's
punishment, but which the legislature has not classified as an element...
must nevertheless be treated as an offense element." '39
In order to resolve this issue, Justice O'Connor looked at many of the
same important cases dealing with due process as the majority. "° The
Justice relied heavily on Patterson, which she believes answers the question
in Apprendi." In Patterson the Court declined to:
adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative countywide, that a
State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact
constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the
culpability of an accused. Traditionally, due process has required
that only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more
subtle balancing of society's interests against those of the accused
have been left to the legislative branch."'
236. Id. She also challenged Justice Thomas' assumption that the case history demonstrates a
broader rule is required that limits judges' discretion. Id. at 527-28. She contended that Justice
Thomas erroneously concluded that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments "'codified' pre-existing
common law." Id. at 527. Even assuming this assertion is correct, the case history actually fails to
"demonstrate any settled understanding" as to what constituted an element of a crime. Id. at 527-28.
Therefore, Justice Thomas' rule that any fact that increases the defendant's punishment is an element
is not required by the Constitution. Id.
237. Id. at 525.
238. See id. at 526-27.
239. Id. at 527.
240. See id. at 530-37 (discussing primarily Winship, Mullaney, Patterson, McMillan,
Almendarez-Torres, and Jones).
241. Seeid.at530.
242. Id. (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977)); see also supra notes 73-86
and accompanying text. The dissent argued that the majority bases its opinion on Mullaney.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 529-30. Justice O'Connor stated the majority cites Mullaney "to demonstrate
the 'lesson' that due process and jury protections extend beyond those factual determinations that
affect a defendant's guilt or innocence." Id.
The dissent then made the stretch that the majority requires all sentencing factors to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. See id. at 530 (finding the majority would apply the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard to all factual determinations that make a difference in the degree
of punishment a defendant receives regardless of whether the factor is used to extend the conviction
beyond the statutory maximum). Justice O'Connor reasoned that Patterson clearly rejected this
broad application of Mullaney's due process requirements. Id. She then cites Almendarez-Torres
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Based on this holding, legislatures have wide discretion in defining the
elements of a crime, and a fact that increases the defendant's punishment
beyond the statutory maximum is not necessarily an element of a crime. 3
Next, Justice O'Connor accused the majority of overruling McMillan by
declaring all sentencing factors unconstitutional.2" Sentencing factors are no
longer constitutional because the majority declared that "'[ilt is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of
facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal
defendant is exposed.., such facts must be established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."'' While the majority stated its holding applies only to
factors that increase the conviction beyond the statutory maximum, 6 the
dissent believes this really means "any fact that increases or alters the range
of penalties to which a defendant is exposed - which, by definition, must
include increases or alterations to either the minimum or maximum penalties
- must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.""2 ' Therefore, Justice
O'Connor believes that McMillan has effectively been overruled, because
the majority's bright-line rule was rejected in McMillan where the Court
held a case-by-case multi-factor analysis was to be used.2"
where the Court explicitly limited Mullaney's holding. Id. at 532. The Court in Almendarez-Torres
stated:
[Mullaney] suggests that Congress cannot permit judges to increase a sentence in light of
recidivism, or any other factor, not set forth in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. This Court's later case, Patterson v. New York.... however, makes
absolutely clear that such a reading of Mullaney is wrong.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 240).
243. Id. It is unclear how the majority can announce the rule that any fact that increases a penalty
beyond the statutory maximum must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt without
overruling Patterson. See id. at 531. The dissent believes the majority's rule requires overruling
Patterson, because Patterson clearly held that not every fact that extends a defendant's conviction
need be defined as an element of a crime that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 530-
32. Furthermore, McMillan does not support the Court's bright-line "increase in the maximum
penalty" rule. Id. at 533-34.
244. Id. at 533.
245. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1998)). Justice O'Connor
challenged the majority to "admit that it is overruling McMillan" and "also to explain why such a
course of action is appropriate under normal principles of stare decisis." Id.
246. See supra notes 193-198 and accompanying text.
247. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 533 (emphasis in original).
248. Id. at 533-35. Justice O'Connor concluded that the majority actually draws support for its
new bright-line rule from McMillan because in McMillan, the Court noted "petitioners' claim would
have had 'at least more superficial appeal' if the firearm possession finding had exposed them to
greater or additional punishment." Id. at 534 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88 (discussing whether
the sentencing factor creates a separate penalty or merely limits the judge's discretion to a penalty
that is within the statutory range). From this statement, the majority adopts the bright-line rule that a
factor may not be used to extend the conviction beyond the statutory maximum. Id. at 533-34.
However, Justice O'Connor found this to be weak support for adopting a new bright-line rule
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2. The Court Should Simply Apply the McMillan Factors to Determine
Whether it is Permissible to Extend a Defendant's Punishment
Beyond the Statutory Maximum
Since the majority's "increase in the maximum penalty" rule is not
mandated by the Constitution and is a drastic departure from the Court's
analysis in past cases, Justice O'Connor applied the McMillan factors to
New Jersey's hate crime statute. 9 First, the hate crime statute "does not
shift the burden of proof on an essential ingredient of the offense by
presuming that ingredient upon proof of other elements of the offense.""2 '
"Second, the magnitude of the New Jersey sentence enhancement... is
constitutionally permissible."'" The weapons possession statute carries a
penalty of five to ten years' imprisonment and the finding of the hate crime
"exposed... [Apprendi] to a higher sentence range of 10 to 20 years'
imprisonment."2 '2 However, a ten-year increase in the conviction "falls well
within the range" the Court has found permissible.25 Third, the statute does
not give the "impression of having been enacted to evade the constitutional
requirements that attach when a State makes a fact an element of the charged
offense.""4 Fourth, New Jersey did not take what had in the past been an
element of the weapons possession offense and turn that into a sentencing
factor.' Finally, "New Jersey 'simply took one factor that has always been
considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment' - a defendant's
motive for committing the criminal offense - 'and dictated the precise weight
to be given that factor' when the motive is to intimidate a person because of
because nowhere in McMillan is there any mention of such a rule. Id. at 533-35. Thus, from the
dissent's perspective, whether a penalty is within the statutory range or extends the penalty beyond
the statutory range is merely part of the traditional five-factor analysis. See id. at 535.
Justice O'Connor then reasoned that neither Almendarez-Torres nor Jones support the
majority's bright-line rule. Id. at 535-36. She believes that in Almendarez-Torres, the Court
explicitly held that judges could impose a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, as was seen
when the Court upheld recidivism as a sentencing factor. Id. Justice O'Connor also concluded that
Jones offers the Apprendi majority little support, because the Jones majority was unable to decide
whether it was permissible for judges to increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum. Id. at
535 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 248-49). Therefore, Justice O'Connor continues to agree with the
dissenters in Jones that Almendarez-Torres in effect decided the issue and clearly rejected the bright-
line rule the majority adopts in Apprendi. Id. at 535 (citing Jones, 268-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "[i]n Almendarez-Torres, we squarely rejected the petitioner's argument that 'any
significant increase in a statutory maximum sentence would trigger a constitutional 'elements'
requirement')).
249. Id. at 552-54; see also supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
250. Id. at 552 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-87; Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 226, 242-43 (1998) where the Court upheld an
eighteen-year enhancement to the defendant's sentence).
254. Id. at 552-53.
255. Id. at 553.
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race."" Therefore, except for the hate motive factor and increase in the
maximum statutory punishment, the New Jersey statute is exactly like those
in Almendarez-Torres and McMillan.257 Based on the factor analysis, Justice
O'Connor was not persuaded that New Jersey sought to evade constitutional
requirements and would uphold the New Jersey sentencing scheme."'
E. Justice Breyer's Dissent: Legislatures Should Have Broad Flexibility to
Define the Elements of Crimes and Use Sentencing Factors259
Since judges have wide discretion to choose which facts they will use to
enhance a defendant's sentence, then it must also be permissible for
legislatures to determine which sentencing factors will be used through a
statute.2' ° Legislatures should have flexibility in choosing to make facts such
as a hate motive sentencing factors because "the Constitution does not freeze
19th-century sentencing practices into permanent law.,1 6' Given that
legislatures retain the ability to experiment with new sentencing practices, it
is puzzling why the Constitution would prohibit a legislature from enacting a
statute where an increase in the maximum penalty is involved.
2 62
Justice Breyer posited that the majority based its rule on two
assumptions. 63  The first was that the majority wants to limit legislatures'
broad authority to transform facts found by juries (elements of the offense)
into sentencing factors determined by judges." The majority reiterated
throughout its opinion that these limitations are a means of preventing states
from "'defin[ing] away facts necessary to constitute a criminal offense.' 2 65
256. Id. (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-90). Although the majority found that a purpose to
intimidate based on race is part of the mens rea element, the dissent cited Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476, 485 (1993) where the Court unanimously upheld a hate crime statute as a sentencing factor
based on the racial hate motive of the defendant. Id. In Mitchell, the Court explained that a
defendant's motive has traditionally been an important factor in sentencing and that this rational
applied to sentencing based on racial hate motive. Id. (citing Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484-85).
Therefore, the New Jersey statute passes McMillan because motive is a traditional sentencing factor,
and the legislature has dictated the precise weight judges should give that factor. Id. at 553-54.
257. Id. at 552-53.
258. Id. at 552-54.
259. Id. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist joined with Justice Breyer. Id.
260. See id. at 555-59. Traditionally, the Court has left legislatures the freedom to determine
elements of crimes based on history, common-law tradition, and current social need. Id. at 559
(citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85).
261. Id. at 559.
262. Id. at 560-61.
263. Id. at 562.
264. Id.
265. Id. (quoting ante, at 486.)
However, the majority's rule does not provide the cure for this disease.2"
The source of the problem is not that legislatures have the power to enact
sentencing factors, but rather the problem stems from: "the traditional
legislative power to select elements defining a crime, the traditional
legislative power to set broad sentencing ranges, and the traditional judicial
power to choose a sentence within that range on the basis of relevant
offender conduct." 6' Hence, the solution is to continue using the Sentencing
Guidelines and allow legislatures to create sentencing rules that specify
punishments based on the defendant's conduct and appropriate procedural
due process protections.268
Justice Breyer argued that judges should be able to find sentencing
factors, but suggested that rather than using a preponderance of the evidence
standard, judges should determine sentencing facts beyond a reasonable
doubt in criminal cases when there are unusual or serious procedural
concerns. 6 ' Therefore, legislatures should retain substantial latitude in
defining sentencing factors, and instead of adopting the Apprendi rule,
legislatures should use the Sentencing Guidelines and beyond a reasonable
doubt standard to protect criminal defendants.7
The second justification the majority gave for its rule is that judges have
traditionally determined "sentences within a legislated range capped by a
maximum (a range that the legislature itself sets)." 7' However, Justice
Breyer does not understand how this rule is particularly relevant to
safeguarding criminal defendants' rights when the rule says nothing about
mandatory minimum sentences. In practice, mandatory minimums are far
more important to criminal defendants than statutory maximums because it
makes a large difference in the severity of the sentence if the minimum is ten
years or only one year in prison.2 Furthermore, the Court's new rule upsets
many states' statutes because up until Apprendi, their legislatures were led to
266. Id.
267. Id. at 562.
268. Id. at 562-63. Justice Breyer believes:
[T]he solution to the problem lies, not in prohibiting legislatures from enacting
sentencing factors, but in sentencing rules that determine punishments on the basis of
properly defined relevant conduct, with sensitivity to the need for procedural protections
where sentencing factors are determined by a judge (for example, use of a "reasonable
doubt" standard), and invocation of the Due Process Clause where the history of the
crime at issue, together with the nature of the facts to be proved, reveals unusual and
serious procedural unfairness.
Id.; see also Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of
the Special Part, 2 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297, 322 (1998) (recognizing that the problem is
"identifying what factors are sufficiently important morally, and accordingly will have sufficiently
serious sentencing consequences, that they ought to be included ... as elements of offenses, and
subject to the procedural safeguards traditionally attaching to such elements").
269. Apprendi, 520 U.S. at 562-63.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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believe they could increase a statutory maximum based on sentencing
factors.73 Thus, the Apprendi holding "creates serious uncertainty about the
constitutionality of such statutes" and the legitimacy of those sentenced
under them.274
V. IMPACT
A. Judicial
1. Justice O'Connor Predicts Shockwaves from Apprendi will be Felt
For a Long Time Because Major Changes in State and Federal
Sentencing Procedures are Required
Following Apprendi, much uncertainty remains in the area of defendant
sentencing and Justice O'Connor predicts this ruling will have a grave
impact on the criminal justice system."' Apprendi's attorney, Joseph D.
O'Neill, estimates that "'[t]he impact is grand because it changes the law in
some 40 other states and the District of Columbia. It changes the way
criminal law is practiced in this country.' ,276 Significantly, Apprendi's
holding threatens to upset current state sentencing schemes, procedures used
in capital punishment cases,27  and likely invalidates the Sentencing
Guidelines used by federal courts.278
a. Capital Punishment
Read broadly, the majority's rule that judges cannot extend a
defendant's conviction beyond the statutory maximum likely invalidates the
United States' capital punishment scheme, because in Apprendi, it was
unconstitutional for a judge to extend a defendant's sentence by only two
years. 79 Analogously, it would be impermissible for a judge to use
sentencing factors and extend an offender's penalty from life imprisonment
273. Id. at 564.
274. Id. at 565. For example, the majority did not discuss the impact their rule will have on drug
offenses where quantity of drugs is a sentencing factor routinely used by judges under the
Sentencing Guidelines. Id.
275. See id. at 535-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
276. Murray, supra note 171, at A13.
277. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 536-39, 544-47.
278. Id. at 549-52.
279. See id. at 536-37, 544.
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to death because the "magnitude of punishment at stake" is greater than that
in Apprendi. °
After a jury verdict, some jurisdictions use a judge rather than a jury to
determine whether there are aggravating or mitigating factors that weigh in
favor of life imprisonment or a death sentence. " Also, under several capital
punishment schemes a judge may disregard a jury's recommendation of life
imprisonment and impose the death penalty. "2 ' Hence, in these jurisdictions
the defendant can only be sentenced to death by a judge's weighing of
certain factors. "3 Based on these sentencing procedures, Justice O'Connor
reasons that:
280. See id. at 536-37, 540-41, 544. In capital punishment cases, the judge is allowed to impose
the death sentence based on a judicial finding of aggravating statutory factors after the jury finds the
defendant guilty of an offense (e.g. first degree murder) that carries with it a maximum penalty of
death. Id. at 537. "If the judge does not find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance,
the maximum punishment authorized by the jury's guilty verdict is life imprisonment." Id.
Apprendi may be implicated because the judge's finding increases the defendant's sentence beyond
life imprisonment, which is the maximum punishment authorized by the jury. Id.; see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 522 (stating Apprendi may "establish[] the broader principle that it is
wrong to punish a person for crimes that were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt").
281. Andrew J. Fuchs, Note, The Effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Blurring the Distinction Between Sentencing Factors and Elements of a Crime, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1429 (2001). In the vast majority of states juries determine the life or
death sentence, unless the defendant requests sentencing by the court. Marcia A. Widder, Hanging
Life in the Balance: The Supreme Court and the Metaphor of Weighing in the Penalty Phase of the
Capital Trial, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1341, 1342 n.6 (1994). However, Nebraska, Montana, Idaho, and
Arizona use a trial judge to determine the sentence after the jury verdict. Id.
282. Fuchs, supra note 281, at 1429. Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana use a trifurcated
system that requires the involvement of the jury and judge in the death penalty sentencing scheme.
Abe Muallem, Note, Harris v. Alabama: Is the Death Penalty in America Entering a Fourth Phase?,
22 J. LEGIS. 85, 87 (1996). After a determination of guilt, a separate penalty hearing is held before a
jury, which renders an advisory opinion for a life or death sentence. Widder, supra note 281, at
1342 n.6. "The trial judge then determines the sentence and may override the jury's
recommendation of a life sentence." Id. In Florida, Indiana, and Delaware, before a judge may
disregard the jury's opinion, he or she must find "'the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so
clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."' Muallem, supra (noting the
clear and convincing requirement in capital punishment sentencing schemes is referred to as the
"'Tedder standard') (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)). Alabama's death
sentencing scheme does not specify any particular standard of proof when overriding a jury's
recommendation. Id. at 99. The Court has rejected "the idea that any specific weight should be
given to particular factors, either in aggravation or mitigation, when considering a death
sentence ...." Id. at 101. However, after Apprendi, any aggravating factor that extends the
defendant's penalty beyond a statutory maximum of life imprisonment must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury. M. Kate Calvert, Obtaining Unanimity and a Standard of Proof on the
Vileness Sub-Elements with Apprendi, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 1 (2000); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490
(stating "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt").
283. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 536-37. Justice O'Connor cited the example of Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 643 (1990) where a jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Id. at 536
(discussing Arizona state capital punishment procedures). After the jury finds the defendant guilty
of first-degree murder, the judge conducts a separate sentence hearing to determine whether the
defendant deserves death or life imprisonment. Id. The Court held in Walton, that this capital
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If a State can remove from the jury a factual determination that
makes the difference between life and death, ... it is inconceivable
why a State cannot do the same with respect to a factual
determination that results in only a 10-year increase in the
maximum sentence to which a defendant is exposed."8
This analogy highlights the theory that if a judge may extend a
defendant's punishment from life imprisonment to the death penalty, then
judges should also be able to enhance a defendant's prison sentence.285 It is
unclear why judges can extend a defendant's sentence in a capital
punishment case, but not in other criminal cases, and this is likely to create
great uncertainty for judges attempting to apply the Apprendi holding. 86
Thus, it appears that the majority has invalidated the current capital
punishment sentencing structure; because, read expansively, the Apprendi
rule prohibits judges from making findings that expose defendants to any
greater punishment than that found by a jury. 7
Ironically, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the majority's rule does
seem to make an exception for capital punishment cases, which means
punishment procedure was constitutional. Id. at 536-37 (citing Walton, 497 U.S. at 647). Walton
means that there is no constitutional requirement that a jury impose the death sentence or make the
factual findings that determine whether the death penalty is appropriate. Id. at 537.
The majority used Walton "to dispose of a possible argument that the Apprendi rule would
render invalid state capital sentencing schemes that allow a judge, after a jury verdict on a capital
crime, to impose a death sentence by finding aggravating factors." Calvert, supra note 282, at 17.
"However, what the Apprendi Court failed to note is that most states .... leave the capital sentencing
decision in the hands of the jury." Id. at 18. Arguably, the rational behind Walton, that judges are
"'presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions'... is not applicable in jury
sentencing states." Id. (quoting Walton, 497 U.S. at 653). Thus, the question remains open whether
Apprendi could be used to challenge death sentences based upon a jury's finding of aggravating
factors. Id.
284. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 537.
285. See id.
286. Id. at 538 (finding "[t]he distinction of... [capital punishment cases] offered by the Court
today is baffling, to say the least"). However, sentencing by judges in capital punishment schemes
does comport with a strict reading of Apprendi, if the assumption is made that judges are merely
determining a defendant's sentence within the permissible statutory range of life imprisonment to the
death penalty. See id. at 496-97. This means that a capital punishment scheme where a judge
weighs aggravating and mitigating factors will be upheld so long as a judge does not "'determine the
existence of a factor which makes a crime a capital offense."' Id. at 497 (quoting Almendarez-
Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 257 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis deleted)). "'[Once a jury has
found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries as its maximum penalty
the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather
than a lesser one, ought to be imposed .... .- Id. (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 257 n.2
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis deleted)).
287. See id. at 497 (majority opinion), 538 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing that if the
majority "does not intend to overrule [the current capital punishment system], one would be hard
pressed to tell from the opinion it issues today" (citation omitted)).
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Apprendi is limited in scope" However, if the majority has made an
exception for capital punishment cases and limited the scope of its holding,
then the maximum penalty rule becomes "meaningless and formalistic."2 "9
The majority upholds the capital punishment sentencing scheme on the basis
that a jury has found all the elements of the crime and a judge is merely
applying a sentence within a statutory range where the maximum penalty is
death. Nonetheless, the rule is formalistic because the "effect on the
defendant would be no different from a scenario in which the statutory
penalty is life and the judge then increases the defendant's sentence past that
maximum and imposes a sentence of death after making certain findings.""29
The formalistic nature of the rule is also apparent in non-capital
punishment scenarios because a state could remove sentencing from a jury
and use a preponderance of the evidence standard to find facts that decrease
the punishment below the prescribed statutory maximum. 9' For example, a
defendant could be sentenced between five to twenty years for weapons
possession.292 However, a judge could find by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant did not act with a hate motive and sentence him to
no greater than ten years imprisonment.93  On closer analysis of this
example, we see the reality is that contained within the weapons possession
sentence of five to twenty years is an assumption that the person acted with a
hate motive.9 To be found not guilty of the hate motive, the judge must
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did not act with
hatred. 95  Thus, as this example illustrates, the majority's statutory
maximum rule is one of form rather than substance, because a state could
merely redefine the language of its statute and allow a judge to determine the
absence of hate motive by a preponderance of the evidence. 6
288. Id. at 540-4 1.
289. Id. at 541.
290. Fuchs, supra note 281, at 1430; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 541. The rule is formalistic
because,
essentially, the jury has simply found the defendant guilty of the crime and has left the
option of imposing the death penalty to the judge. Mere wording of the statute would
dictate the availability of the protections that the defendant is entitled to receive, and in
capital punishment jurisprudence, formalism should arguably be most carefully
scrutinized.
Fuchs, supra note 281, at 1430.
291. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 541-43.
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 541-44. Justice O'Connor concluded:
If New Jersey can, consistent with the Constitution, make precisely the same differences
in punishment turn on precisely the same facts, and can remove the assessment of those
facts from the jury and subject them to a standard of proof below "beyond a reasonable
doubt," it is impossible to say that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments require
the Court's rule.
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b. Federal and State Criminal Sentencing Schemes
i. The Biggest Impact of Apprendi Will be to Declare
Sentencing Schemes Unconstitutional and Overturn Vast
Numbers of Convictions
The Court has never ruled on the proper standard to be used under the
federal Sentencing Guidelines 97 and it is highly questionable after Apprendi
whether the frequently used preponderance standard is constitutional.9 ' In
response to this uncertainty, Justice O'Connor focused on the strong impact
of Apprendi that will be felt throughout federal and state courtrooms.299 She
predicts that "in light of the adoption of ... sentencing [factors] ... by many
States and the Federal Government, the consequences of the Court's and
Justice Thomas' rules in terms of sentencing schemes invalidated by...
[Apprendi] will likely be severe."3" The decision will have broad effects on
sentencing procedures because it has been common practice in our judicial
system for judges to frequently make "'sentencing decisions on the basis of
facts that they determined for themselves, on less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt"' in all kinds of different criminal cases."' Therefore, the
holding in Apprendi that "a defendant is entitled to have a jury decide, by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact relevant to the determination of
[his] sentence ... will have the effect of invalidating significant sentencing
reform accomplished at the federal and state levels over the past three
decades."3"
Id. at 543 (responding to Justice Thomas' opinion that the Constitution mandates the majority's
statutory maximum rule).
297. Richard Husseini, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear and
Convincing Evidence as the Burden of Proof, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1387, 1391-93 (1990) (recognizing
that the Guidelines do not state that any specific standard of proof must be used); see also Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 497 n.21 (noting the Guidelines are not before the Court).
298. See infra notes 303-316 and accompanying text; see also Husseini, supra note 297, at 1394-
1411 (arguing that the constitutionality of the preponderance standard is unclear under McMillan and
Winship and thus advocating the use of the clear and convincing evidence standard).
299. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 543-53.
300. Id. at 544. An assistant prosecutor in Texas expects that "Apprendi is going to be one of the
most-significant rulings in the 21st century" because it could change the way state and federal
prosecutors present certain cases to a grand jury. Cammarere, supra note 3, at 41. Joseph D.
O'Neill, Apprendi's lawyer, believes this case will "'probably [be] the most-important decision in
the criminal area in the past four or five years."' Id.
301. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 545 (quoting Lynch, supra note 268, at 320 (footnote omitted)).
302. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 549. The majority's holding will affect both discretionary-sentencing
schemes (where a judge finds any number of facts that are never presented at trial and found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt) and determinative-sentencing schemes (where a judge finds specific
facts that are stated in guidelines). Id. at 543-47; see also J. Stephen Welch, Apprendi v. New Jersey
Although the majority declined to hold whether the federal Sentencing
Guidelines remain constitutional, 3 the likely result of the Court's rule if
applied broadly is that the Guidelines are invalid."° As a result, the biggest
impact of Justice Stevens' decision will be seen in the vast number of
defendants that will appeal convictions based on sentencing factors.0 5
Justice O'Connor predicts that Apprendi "threatens to unleash a flood of
petitions by convicted defendants" seeking to overturn convictions that were
based on determinative-sentencing schemes, such as the federal Sentencing
Guidelines." Based on statistics gathered by the United States Sentencing
Commission, nearly a half-million defendants have been sentenced under the
Guidelines.0 7 Furthermore, many state sentencing practices would be upset
because forty-seven states allow the judge to set the sentence for defendants
in non-capital felony cases, thirteen states permit the judge to set the
conviction in capital felony cases (includes instances where the jury gives
sentencing recommendation to the judge), twelve states allow judges to alter
sentences (first determined by juries or judges) in capital felony cases, and
five states allow the judiciary to change sentences (after set by judge or jury)
in non-capital felony cases.?°
Moreover, federal cases are "only the tip of the iceberg."3 °O In 1998,
federal criminal cases constituted only 0.4% of the total number of criminal
prosecutions in state and federal courts.3 ' Since the Court has failed to
clarify the exact reach of its holding, "federal and state judges are left in a
state of limbo.""' Courts at state, federal, and local levels, as well as
Watershed Ruling for the New Millennium?, 12 S.C. LAW. 36, 39 (2001) (explaining how Apprendi
applies to sentencing enhancements for drugs, terrorism, and weapons in criminal activities); Justin
A. Thornton & Mark H. Allenbaugh, Apprendictis: A Troubling Diagnosis for the Sentencing of
Hackers, Thieves, Fraudsters, and Tax Cheats, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 444 (2000) (arguing
that the Apprendi ruling extends to economic crimes).
303. See supra notes 194-195 and accompanying text.
304. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 549-51. "[T]he Court does not say whether these schemes are
constitutional, but its reasoning strongly suggests that they are not." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 551-52.
306. Id. at 551; see also supra note 302.
307. Id.
308. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1998, Table 46 Sentencing
Procedures in Capital and Non-Capital Felony Cases (June 2000), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs
/pub/pdf/sco98.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2002); supra, at Table 44 Sentencing Statutes: Key
Definitions and Provisions For Sentence Enhancement (listing a state by state breakdown of
criminal statutes, statutory maximums, and possible sentencing enhancements).
309. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 551.
310. Id. (showing that in 1998 14,623,330 state criminal cases were filed, compared to only
57,691 federal criminal cases); see also SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000,
JUDICIAL PROCESSING OF DEFENDANTS, TABLE 5.25, at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ (last
visited Mar. 30, 2002) (providing a detailed statistical breakdown of the number of individuals
sentenced for particular offenses in fiscal year 1999, and showing 55,388 people were actually
sentenced under the federal Sentencing Guidelines).
311. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 551 (lamenting the majority has created confusion in the world of
criminal sentencing because the Court has not defined "the precise contours of the constitutional
principle underlying its decision .... ").
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legislatures, are left wondering whether they should continue to convict
defendants under sentencing schemes that allow judges to find sentencing
factors by a preponderance of the evidence." '  Justice O'Connor
summarized, many changes in American sentencing schemes seem imminent
because the majority's "reasoning suggests that each new sentence will rest
on shaky ground."33  Perhaps "[t]he most unfortunate aspect of [the
Apprendi] decision is that [the Court's] precedents did not foreordain this
disruption in the world of sentencing."3 ' Rather, the Court "traditionally
took a cautious approach to questions like the one presented in this case.""'
However, Apprendi's majority "throws that caution to the wind and, in the
process, threatens to cast sentencing in the United States into what will
likely prove to be a lengthy period of considerable confusion."
'316
ii. Justice Breyer Argues that Policy Supports the Sentencing
Guidelines
Justice Breyer, an author of the Sentencing Guidelines,37 is also troubled
that Apprendi calls into question the continuing validity of the federal
sentencing scheme."8  In modem criminal procedure, broad judicial
discretion is essential because it is too difficult, confusing, or inefficient for
a jury to decide the presence of factors that are highly prejudicial to the
defendant when the big question is guilt or innocence.39 Therefore, it is
necessary for a judge to determine the degrees of bias that a defendant may
have exhibited towards his or her victim.
320
While at first glance it appears that the goal of the majority's rule"2' is to
protect criminal defendants' rights,322 in actuality the rule is unworkable
312. See id.
313. Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Richard Singer, The Model Penal Code and Three Two (Possibly Only One) Ways Courts
Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 161 n.54 (2000) (noting the dissenting opinions in
Jones and Apprendi clearly express Breyer's sentiment that the Sentencing Guidelines may be in
jeopardy); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Consider Hate-Crime Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2000, at A22. Justice Breyer worked on the Sentencing Guidelines when he had a job with the
Senate in the 1970s. Id.
318. See id. Justice Breyer responded to Apprendi's lawyer, that "'[iuf I agree with you, I guess
I'm holding the Sentencing Commission unconstitutional' because judges, not juries, apply the
various factors that determine a defendant's sentence." id.
319. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 556-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
320. See id.
321. Justice Breyer concluded the majority's rule is that the Constitution requires: "[Any fact
[other than recidivism] that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
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because it envisions a "procedural ideal" where juries rather than judges
predominantly determine the existence of facts that increase a defendant's
punishment. 3  However, "the real world of criminal justice" cannot be
expected to meet such an ideal, 324 because the system can only function
efficiently and effectively when judges have broad discretion to find these
facts.2 ' Therefore, it appears that requiring juries to find sentencing factors
beyond a reasonable doubt is impractical and that such a sentencing
procedure stands at odds with what the Constitution requires of our justice
system."'
The Sentencing Guidelines are justified because policy and practical
concerns weigh in favor of protecting criminal defendants from juries that
could be confused or inflamed when determining the existence of sentencing
factors.3" In modem times, judges have been given wide latitude in finding
facts and sentencing defendants because there are "far too many potentially
relevant sentencing factors to permit submission of all (or even many) of
them to a jury. '" Asking a jury to consider such factors where the real
question is guilt or innocence, "could easily place the defendant in the
awkward (and conceivably unfair) position of having to deny he committed
the crime yet offer proof about how he committed it, e.g., 'I did not sell
drugs, but I sold no more than 500 grams.' 39 Hence, in today's criminal
justice system, judges use sentencing factors to individualize the defendant's
punishment so that it is tailored to that defendant's particular crime?30 Thus,
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 555 (alteration
in original).
322. See id. at 564 (stating he is willing "to assume that the majority's rule would provide a
degree of increased procedural protection ... [however, it] provides little practical help and comes at
too high a price").
323. Id. at 555.
324. Id.
325. See id. The criminal justice system functions because of "procedural compromises" between
the judge and jury in the area of defendant sentencing. Id. The majority's holding has a tendency to
upset the compromise by implementing a sentencing procedure never mandated by the Constitution.
See id. Furthermore, "the rationale that underlies the Court's rule suggests a principle - jury
determination of all sentencing-related facts - that, unless restricted, threatens the workability of
every criminal justice system (if applied to judges) or threatens efforts to make those systems more
uniform, hence more fair .. " Id. at 565.
326. See id. at 555.
327. Id. at 555-57.
328. Id. at 557. For example, the Sentencing Guidelines state that a judge should consider
whether,
[a] bank robber with (or without) a gun, which the robber kept hidden (or brandished),
might have frightened (or merely warned), injured seriously (or less seriously), tied up
(or simply pushed) a guard, a teller or a customer, at night (or at noon), for a bad (or
arguably less bad) motive, in an effort to obtain money for other crimes (or for other
purposes), in the company of a few (or many) other robbers, for the first (or fourth) time
that day, while sober (or under the influence of drugs or alcohol), and so forth.
Id. (quotation omitted).
329. Id. at 557.
330. Id. at 557-58 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249-51 (1949)).
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the Sentencing Guidelines serve the important functions of giving judges a
set of criteria to consider which promotes uniformity in defendants'
punishment, while at the same time allows judges to be "guided by
experience, relevance, and a sense of proportional fairness. '
2. Apprendi Should be Narrowly Construed with Respect to the
Sentencing Guidelines, Capital Punishment and the Recidivism
Exception, However Apprendi has Forced Courts to Rethink
Defendant Sentencing in Drug Cases
a. Apprendi Clearly Applies to Drug Cases and Now Juries Must
Determine Factors Used to Enhance Penalties Beyond the
Statute's Maximum
Many commentators have predicted Apprendi would result in a massive
overhaul of sentencing schemes, especially in the realm of drug
convictions.332 However, in actuality, courts have minimized the impact of
331. Id. Before the Sentencing Guidelines, judges would impose very different sentences upon
defendants involved in essentially the same type of criminal conduct. See id. Under the Sentencing
Guidelines system, judges "retain[] freedom to depart in atypical cases." Id. at 560. Overturning the
Guidelines would eliminate the benefits of the Guidelines including sentence uniformity, avoiding
the interjection of jury sympathies, which would create disparate sentences, and allowing judges
who have experience sentencing defendants that are similarly situated to determine the penalty. See
Fuchs, supra note 281, at 1437-38.
Under the Guidelines, a particular crime e.g. narcotics possession with intent to distribute,
carries with it a specific statutory maximum. Id. at 1418. To determine the sentencing range for this
crime, the Guidelines provide the judge with a method of generating an appropriate range. Id. at
1417-18. The judge determines the range by looking at the individual defendant's criminal record
e.g., prior convictions, and the seriousness of the instant crime he or she is charged with e.g., the
crime is more serious if there is a high quantity of drugs. Id. The penalty imposed by the judge
must be within this narrow sentencing range, which is bound by the statutory maximum for the
particular crime. Id. Because the judge is limited to imposing a sentence that is capped by a
statutory maximum, Apprendi should not be used to invalidate the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at
1418. Under a limited application of Apprendi, its rule would be applied to specific instances
where the sentence is extended beyond the statutory maximum. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein,
Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1479 (2001). Thus, "the narrow Apprendi rule does not
threaten presumptive sentencing schemes such as the Guidelines, so long as the sentences dictated
by statute, court rule, or guideline are within the maximum sentence authorized by statute for the
offense." Id.
332. See Greenhouse, supra note 2, at A 19 (concluding Apprendi "opens the door" to challenges
in the area of federal drug sentences); see also Mumma, supra, note 150, at Al (predicting the ruling
will have a wide impact on cases involving "'penalty enhancements"'); Cammarere, supra note 3, at
41 (surveying appellate court responses to Apprendi and determining "the clear impact has been on
drug cases, with a number of federal appellate courts ruling the quantity of drugs - a fact that can
dramatically increase a sentence - is an issue for a jury to decide"); Claire Cooper & Denny Walsh,
Courts Must Reconsider Some Sentences For Offenders, SACRAMENTO BEE, available at
Apprendi by narrowly construing its holding.333 Circuit courts have tended to
limit the application of Apprendi to situations where a factor is used to
increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum33' and have narrowly
applied Apprendi to the Guidelines."' Nevertheless, drug cases remain
particularly vulnerable to the Apprendi holding because the jury finds
whether the defendant is guilty, while the judge "makes many crucial
http://www.november.org/apprendi9thcircuit.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2001) (stating Erwin
Chemerinsky found that by the end of August 2000, thirty-six state and federal courts had grappled
with the Apprendi case); Lawrence Messina, U.S. Supreme Court Influencing Sentencing Here
Ruling Could Radically Change How Judges Calculate Prison Terms in Federal Court,
CHARLESTON GAZETrE & DAILY MAIL, July 25, 2000, at A2, available at 2000 WL 2619088
(finding prosecutors expect Apprendi to have its biggest impact on drug cases).
333. See Jones v. United States, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000), remanded to United States v. Jones, 235
F.3d 1231, 1233 (10th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter "Carless Jones"]. After Apprendi, the Tenth Circuit
concluded, the rule in Jones v. United States 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (from the 9th Circuit and
discussed supra at notes 126-145 and accompanying text) has "been explicitly adopted by the
Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey." Carless Jones, 235 F.3d at 1233. The Tenth Circuit
recognized courts were in agreement that Apprendi should be narrowly construed so as not to
overrule the Sentencing Guidelines, and only be applied in the limited instances where a sentencing
factor is used to increase a conviction beyond the statutory maximum. See id. at 1233 n. 1.
334. See id. The court noted the following decisions where Apprendi's holding had been limited:
United States v. Angle, 230 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying Apprendi to
prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 841 and holding that drug quantity must be presented to a
jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt to impose a sentence greater than the twenty-
year maximum authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(C)); United States v. Doggett, 230
F.3d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 542-43
(6th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933-34 (8th Cir.
2000) (same); United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2000) (same);
United States v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11 th Cir. 2000) (same).
Id.
After Carless Jones, the remaining circuits also limited Apprendi. See United States v.
Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 41 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding Apprendi only applies when the sentence extends
beyond the statutory maximum, but not when the sentence is within the prescribed range). Although
"the question of whether, after Apprendi, a judge's fact findings that create a higher mandatory
minimum violate a defendant's right to a jury trial is an open one in this circuit, that question is not
before us" and thus, the holding is limited to cases where the sentence is extended beyond the
maximum. United States v. Champion, 234 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2nd Cir. 2000); see also United States
v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 267-68 & n.5 (3rd Cir. 2000) (leaving open the question of whether the
Sentencing Guidelines could ever be unconstitutional, but limiting Apprendi to statutory
maximums); United States v. Akinwale, 248 F.3d 1160 (unpublished table opinion), available at
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30192, at *8 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding "Apprendi has no application in
calculating guideline ranges" and "[mioreover, Apprendi is irrelevant to [defendant's] case because
the term of imprisonment imposed by the district court is less than 20 years - the lowest statutory
maximum for heroin offenses" (citation omitted)); United States v. Williams, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
26679, at *1-2 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion) (finding Apprendi irrelevant
because sentence is within the statutory range).
335. See Cammarere, supra note 3, at 41 (no federal court has overruled the Guidelines but
Apprendi still casts doubt over their validity); see also Fuchs supra note 281, at 1427-38 (arguing
Apprendi should be narrowly construed to apply in situations where the sentence is increased beyond
the statutory maximum so that the Sentencing Guidelines are not invalidated); cf Masters, supra
note 2, at Al (quoting Fourth Circuit Court judge, William W. Wilkins Jr., chairman of the
Sentencing Commission, "[m]y reading of Apprendi leads me to conclude this decision will not
have a dramatic effect,"' because "'[it does not apply to many factors found in the guidelines, such
as role in the offense').
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determinations about the type and quantity of the drugs, the harm caused by
the offense and the characteristics of the offender. 33 6 After Apprendi, many
courts and lawyers may find that prosecuting drug offenders has become
more difficult because defendants frequently contest the amount of drugs
they are alleged to have sold, which means it would be hard to get a jury of
twelve people to each agree on the exact quantity sold.337 Thus, before
Apprendi, judges decided how much was sold; now juries must sometimes
make this determination.
In United States v. Angle, Judge James H. Michael from the Fourth
Circuit explained the impact of Apprendi on drug cases.39 He summarized,
336. Greenhouse, supra note 2, at A19; see also SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
2000, JUDICIAL PROCESSING OF DEFENDANTS, TABLE 5.25, TABLE 5.34, available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2002) (showing that between 1990 to 1999
a total of 169,851 people were sentenced in United States District Courts for drug offenses and in
fiscal year 1999 alone, 20,079 people were convicted under the Guidelines for drug crimes); Kyle
O'Dowd, Grid & Bear It: Weighing the Evidence: Drug Quantity Issues in Mandatory Minimum
Cases, 24 CHAMPION 43, 43-44 (2000) (noting the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Apprendi v.
New Jersey to clarify whether sentencing factors, such as those in drug cases could be used to extend
the statutory maximum, and that prior to Apprendi the law of the twelve circuits was that drug
quantity was a sentencing factor and not an element of the of crime drug trafficking).
Interestingly, the Supreme Court started its new term by beginning where it left off in
Apprendi by "directing a potential revolution in federal sentencing" in the area of drug sentencing.
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup; Justices' Decisions Shape New Course for U.S.
Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2000, at A18. The revolution Greenhouse refers to is the Court's
seemingly unwavering adherence to its policy that drug convictions must be within the statutory
maximum. See id. (concluding it is now clear a jury must determine facts that can lead to a sentence
longer than the maximum, however, the Supreme Court chose not to touch the broader Guidelines
question).
The Court bolstered Apprendi by remanding several circuit court cases back to be
reconsidered in light of that decision. See Burton v. United States, 531 U.S. 801 (2000) (mem.),
remanded to Burton v. United States, 237 F.3d 490, 490-91 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding
intent to distribute drugs must be alleged in indictment, found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
when it enhances sentence above statutory maximum); Blue v. United States, 531 U.S. 801 (2000)
(mem.) (vacating and remanding back to Fourth Circuit); Gibson v. United States, 531 U.S. 801
(2000) (mem.) (vacating and remanding back to Fourth Circuit); Cammarere, supra note 3, at 41
(reporting that after Gibson, the U.S. Attorney's Office changed how it indicts criminals and now
drug quantity must be specified in the indictment); Wims v. United States, 531 U.S. 801(2000)
(mem.) (vacating and remanding back to Eleventh Circuit).
337. See Cammarere, supra note 3, at 41. One expert on criminal sentencing framed the issue
after Apprendi as:
"The question is how formalist the court will be .... [tiremendously important factual
questions are decided at sentencing." For example .... the guidelines instruct judges to
impose a sentence based not on the precise quantity of drugs for which a defendant was
convicted, but on the "relevant quantity," which requires deciding whether a defendant
caught with a small quantity of drugs knew about an entire shipment of which the small
amount formed a part.
Greenhouse, supra note 336, at A18.
338. See id.
339. United States v. Angle, 230 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 2000), aff'd in part en banc, 254 F.3d 514,
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"[h]istorically, this court and all of her sister circuits have held that drug
quantity is a sentencing factor, not an element of the crime."" Although the
Court held in Jones that any fact, other than prior conviction, that raises the
penalty beyond the statutory maximum is an element of the crime and must
be charged in the indictment," circuit courts "interpreted this opinion as a
suggestion rather than an absolute rule." '342 Thus, before Apprendi, drug
quantity was still viewed as a sentencing factor because Jones "'never
ultimately resolved the constitutional doubts it raised.'
Now after Apprendi, all the circuit courts must hold that the "quantity of
drugs" factor is an element of the crime and cannot be a sentencing factor
when drug quantity is used to extend a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum." Courts, like the Fifth Circuit, have responded to Apprendi by
overruling pre-Jones jurisprudence in which drug quantity was a sentencing
factor found by a judge, rather than an element of the crime.45 The Fifth
517 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding no plain error under Apprendi and upholding defendants'
convictions, but remanding for factual finding on quantity of drugs).
340. Angle, 230 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81, 85
(4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Thomas, 204 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Hester,
199 F.3d 1287, 1291 (lth Cir. 2000); United States v. Williams, 194 F.3d 100, 107 (D.C. Cir.
1999); United States v. Mabry, 3 F.3d 244, 250 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Underwood, 982
F.2d 426, 429 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Moreno, 899 F.2d 465, 472-73 (6th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 545, 551 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Gibbs, 813 F.2d 596,
599-600 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Morgan, 835 F.2d 79, 81 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Normandeau, 800 F.2d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1986)).
341. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
342. Id.
343. Id. (quotation omitted).
344. United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 542 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding Apprendi only applies if
there is an increase in the statutory maximum); United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858 (3rd Cir.
2000), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 49 (2001) (mem.) (concluding that judge increased defendant's
sentence by making factual finding that defendant possessed a certain amount of drugs, but did not
go beyond the statutory maximum and hence, Apprendi does not apply); United States v. Aguayo-
Delgado, 220 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000) (abandoning Eighth Circuit authority upholding drug quantity
as sentencing factor to the extent it is inconsistent with Apprendi), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026
(2000) (mem.); Singer, supra note 317, at 209-16 (providing a comprehensive analysis of whether
"drug amount" is an element of the crime and method used to determine the amount). "[TIhe federal
courts have held that the amount or type of drugs involved in an offense, although sometimes
significantly increasing the punishment, was not an 'element' of the crime but a 'sentencing factor.'
Most state courts, however, disagree, holding that the amount is an element provable at trial."
Singer, supra note 318, at 186. Forty-five states consider drug amount an element of the crime that
must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, while three states use a judge to determine
amount. Id. at 210. The remaining states "do not appear to use amount of drugs to differentiate
among drug crimes at all." Id. at 209.
345. United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 785-87 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1182 (2001) (mem.); see also United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding drug quantity under Apprendi must be found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt if it extends
conviction over statutory maximum), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1177 (2001) (mem.); United States v.
Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 575-77 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding Apprendi should not be read
overbroadly), cert. denied Parker v. United States, 531 U.S. 1100 (2001) (mem.); see also Edwards
v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 513-14 (1998) (upholding the Sentencing Guidelines and stating
"[tihe Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this one to determine both the amount
and the kind of 'controlled substances' for which a defendant should be held accountable - and then
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Circuit held that Apprendi should be strictly read and limited to instances
when the factor "drug quantity" is used to increase a sentence beyond the
statutory maximum.4 6 This holding comports with Apprendi, because it
would be an "overbroad" interpretation of Apprendi to hold the Sentencing
Guidelines unconstitutional."
Fifth Circuit Judge Emilio M. Garza explicitly declined to interpret
Apprendi expansively. ' He stated:
Apprendi does not clearly resolve whether an enhancement which
increases a sentence within the statutory range but which does not
increase the sentence beyond that range must be proved to the jury.
However, the opinion suggests the more limited rule: "fact[s] that
increase[] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63 (emphasis
added). Additionally, the Apprendi majority expressly declined to
reverse an earlier opinion allowing a judge to determine by a
preponderance whether an enhancement should apply, instead
limiting that case's "holding to cases that do not involve the
imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum
for the offense established by the jury's verdict." Id. at 2361 n.13
(discussing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct.
2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), and noting that it might reconsider the
holding in the future). Given that the more limited reading of
Apprendi is a more plausible reading of the case, and given the
profound effect a broader rule would have on existing Supreme
Court and Fifth Circuit precedent, we believe the limited reading of
Apprendi is the more desirable one. Cf United States v. Aguayo-
Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933[-34] (8th Cir. 2000) ("If the non-jury
factual determination only narrows the sentencing judge's discretion
within the range already authorized by the offense of conviction....
then the governing constitutional standard is provided by
McMillan.").-49
to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind").
346. See Keith, 230 F.3d. at 786-87 (concluding drug quantity is an element and must be alleged
in the indictment and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt if the factor increases the
conviction beyond the statutory maximum).
347. Id. at 787.
348. See Meshack, 225 F.3d at 576.
349. Id.; see also United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 2000). In Behrman,
the defendant argued that paying $243,000 in restitution for tax fraud although within the statutory
Therefore, the court determined that Apprendi should only apply when a
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, and not to instances where a
sentence is enhanced within the statutory range based on a finding of drug
quantity. 5
b. Courts Should Not Apply Apprendi Retroactively in Habeas
Corpus Appeals or Consider Apprendi a Mandate to Overrule
Almendarez- Torres' Recidivism Exception
i. Habeas Corpus Appeals
Erwin Chemerinsky concluded that after Apprendi, there is the big
question of whether its holding applies retroactively."' Under Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that criminal
procedure cases are retroactive "if they place certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law or if they
are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 2 and watershed rule[s] of
criminal procedure. 353  Apprendi clearly deals with criminal procedure
because it "concerns when the criminal law may punish a person for a
crime" and hence "goes to the question of guilt."35' There is also "a strong
argument that it is a 'watershed rule"' because "Justice O'Connor used that
very term to describe the decision." ''  It is apparent that courts are now
maximum, was such a high dollar amount that it violated Apprendi. Id. at 1053-54. The judge easily
dismissed this allegation by stating the defendant,
treats [Apprendi] as fundamentally changing the law of criminal sentencing, so that every
fact affecting punishment must be treated as an "element of the offense," with all that
implies in criminal law. Yet that is not how the Supreme Court described its decision.
What Apprendi holds is: "Other than the fact of a criminal conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490); cf. Thornton & Allenbaugh, supra note 302, at 444-45
(arguing Apprendi applies to tax fraud because sentencing for economic crimes "is driven entirely by
sentencing factors").
350. See Meshack, 225 F.3d at 576; see also United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 165 (5th Cir.
2000). The court in Keith, 230 F.3d at 786-87 noted Meshack was the case where the Fifth Circuit
limited Apprendi and thereafter, Doggett "squarely" held that Apprendi should only be applied when
drug quantity extends the sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Thus, in Keith, the court
concluded that even though the defendant's sentence was extended to twenty years because of drug
quantity, Apprendi did not apply since this was well within the statutory maximum of thirty years.
Keith, 230 F.3d at 737.
351. See Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 521.
352. Id. at 522-23 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692-93 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted)).
353. Id. at 523 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)
(discussing Mackey)).
354. Id.
355. Id.
776
[Vol. 29: 729, 2002] Apprendi v. New Jersey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
faced with the question of how to handle prisoners' appeals that claim they
were sentenced in violation of Apprendi 56
Although courts have begun applying Apprendi to drug laws, federal
circuit courts have declined to apply Apprendi retroactively in successive
habeas corpus appeals."7 The First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits
have taken the approach "that until the Supreme Court says whether
Apprendi is retroactive, the case cannot be used by prisoners to request a
certificate of appealability from a federal court to file a second or successive
motion for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. [§] 2225." ' A Minnesota
federal district court found otherwise and attempted to apply Apprendi
retroactively "because its holding concerns procedures that 'are implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty."'359 However, this decision was overturned
on appeal."
In Talbott v. Indiana, Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook summarily
rejected defendant's argument that Apprendi applied to habeas corpus
appeals.36 The judge stated:
[the defendant] is among the throngs of state and federal prisoners
who believe that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
undermines their sentences.... Not one of the Apprendi-based
356. See id. at 522-23.
357. Cammarere, supra note 3, at 41; see also Claire Cooper & Denny Walsh, Courts Must
Reconsider Some Sentences For Offenders, SACRAMENTO BEE, at http://www.november.org/aprendi
9thcircuit.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2001) (summarizing that many courts have found violations of
the Apprendi statutory maximum rule, however, the defendants' convictions were still upheld
because there was "harmless error").
358. Cammarere, supra note 3, at 41; see also, e.g., Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d
10-18 (1st Cir. 2000). The First Circuit asked whether the defendant is able to raise a 28 U.S.C. §
2255 habeas corpus claim either as a first petition, or by permission of the court as a second or
successive petition, or because the petition fell within § 2255's savings clause. Sustache-Rivera, 221
F.3d at 11. The court followed the rule that a new constitutional rule is only retroactive if the
Supreme Court chooses to give it that status. Id. at 16-17.
The Supreme Court may yet hold that the Jones/Apprendi rule is to be retroactively
applied to cases on collateral review. (This likely depends upon whether the Court
considers the Jones/Apprendi rule procedural or substantive.) Until that time, any second
or successive petition seeking retroactive application of Jones must be considered
premature.
Id. at 15 n.12. Thus, for now, federal courts have rejected a retroactive application of Apprendi.
Cammarere, supra note 3, at 41.
359. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 104 (citing United States v. Murphy, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (D.
Minn. 2000) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989)).
360. The district court's decision in Murphy to grant habeas corpus relief was vacated on appeal
and the defendant's original sentence restored because the Supreme Court has not held Apprendi
applies retroactively. Murphy v. United States, 268 F.3d 599, 600-01 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied
122 S. Ct. 1189 (2002) (mem.).
361. Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 868-69 (7th Cir. 2000).
applications for permission to file has been granted, however, and
none is going to be granted in the near future, for a fundamental
reason: a new decision of the Supreme Court justifies a second or
successive collateral attack only if it establishes "a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. §§
2244(b)(2)(A), 2255 8(2)....
Apprendi does not state that it applies retroactively to other cases
on collateral review. No other decision of the Supreme Court
applies Apprendi retroactively to cases on collateral review....
[Thus], no application based on Apprendi can be authorized under §
2244 (b)(2)(A) or § 2255 8(2). Accord, Sustache-Rivera v. United
States, 221 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000). If the Supreme Court ultimately
declares that Apprendi applies retroactively on collateral attack, we
will authorize successive collateral review of cases to which
Apprendi applies. Until then prisoners should hold their horses and
stop wasting everyone's time with futile applications."'
Therefore, although Apprendi did announce a new constitutional rule,
courts tend to reduce the scale of Apprendi by refusing to hear prisoners'
appeals."3
ii. Apprendi Does Not Overrule Almendarez-Torres
In addition to denying retroactivity, courts have cut back the scope of
Apprendi by upholding previous Supreme Court cases that could possibly be
invalidated under a broad reading of Apprendi.3" In United States v.
Gebele,36 the defendant argued that Apprendi overruled Almendarez-Torres
because the Justices in the Apprendi majority posited that Almendarez-
Torres was wrongly decided.3" Almendarez-Torres is still good law because
362. Id. (emphasis added).
363. Id.
364. See generally, United States v. Gebele, 117 F. Supp. 2d 540 (W.D. Va. 2000) (upholding
recidivism exception).
365. 117 F. Supp. 2d at 544. In Gebele, the sixty-year-old defendant was found guilty of illegally
entering the United States. Id. He was also convicted in the United States when he was a juvenile
for carrying a weapon. Id. The fact of this prior conviction (recidivism) was found by a judge as a
sentencing factor, and used to extend his conviction beyond the two-year statutory maximum for
illegal reentry cases. Id.
366. Id. at 548-49. The Gebele court reasoned that the Supreme Court clearly stated it was not
overruling Almendarez-Torres, in Apprendi:
Even though it is arguable that AImendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a
logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were
contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision's validity and we need not revisit it for
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the "court is not permitted to ignore it by 'counting Justices,' or by
speculating about what the Supreme Court might do in the future."367
Furthermore, it is compelling that the Court specifically exempted
recidivism from the Apprendi holding."' Therefore, Apprendi's impact can
be limited by continuing to recognize recidivism as an exception to the
statutory maximum rule.36
B. Legislatures
As Justices O'Connor and Breyer highlighted in their dissents,
legislatures have long relied on the Court's decisions in McMillian, where
the Court reaffirmed that legislatures enjoy substantial flexibility and
deference in their definitions of elements of the crime, and Almendarez-
Torres, where the Court upheld extending a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum.7 ° Depending on how expansively Apprendi is interpreted,
legislatures may be forced to rewrite massive amounts of criminal law,
especially in the area of drug offenses."' However, "even if courts begin
reading Apprendi broadly and strike down statutes, ... lawmakers will not
rush to act. 'This is not a ruling where a lot [of] defendants walk free from
jail, .... ' [i]nstead, it involves resentencing. '372 The result is that legislatures
purposes of our decision today to treat the case as a narrow exception to the general rule
we recalled at the outset.
Id. at 548-49 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90 (footnote omitted)).
367. Id. at 549.
368. Id. "'Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
369. See id.
370. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 533-35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 555-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting) see
also supra notes 229-234, 260-274 and accompanying text. Although legislatures generally retain
the freedom to identify elements of a crime, and the sentencing factors that may be used to enhance
punishment of that crime,
recent Supreme Court sentencing jurisprudence suggests strongly that legislatures may
not draft criminal statutes in such a way that sentencing factors trump criminal elements.
In other words, legislatures may not draft criminal statutes that make the conduct
underlying the sentencing factor the focus of punishment, rather than the conduct
constituting the elements of the criminal offense. As legislatures may not delegate to
another body authority they themselves do not possess, it follows that sentencing
commissions, to whom legislatures have delegated authority to promulgate sentencing
guidelines, likewise may not draft sentencing guidelines to include sentencing factors that
trump the elements of the crime.
Thornton & Allenbaugh, supra note 302, at 442.
371. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 564-65 (noting that legislatures have previously relied on the
belief that "they were permitted to increase a statutory maximum sentence on the basis of a
sentencing factor").
372. Cammarere, supra note 3, at 41.
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can wait for the courts to interpret criminal statutes, rather than immediately
passing new laws.373  Although Apprendi could be read "'extremely
broadly"' so that many federal statutes would have to be reworked, this may
not be necessary depending on how prosecutors present their cases to grand
juries.374 As long as prosecutors present sentencing factor issues to juries,
such as drug quantity, "[s]tatutes that seemingly violate Apprendi's holding
could remain intact .... ,
Surprisingly, Apprendi is expected to "have only a modest impact in the
area of hate crime legislation because most states already require a jury to
make the finding of motive under the reasonable doubt standard." '376 The
impact will not be dramatic because more than forty state legislatures have
enacted new hate-crime legislation that treats bias-motivated violence as an
element of the hate crime: Other states have opted to add bias as an
element to already existing crimes. 378 Furthermore, the widely used "'three-
strikes-and-you're in' prison policy" appears safe because the majority
specifically excluded recidivism, which is one of the routine methods used
to increase a defendant's penalty.379
373. See id.; see also Robert Batey, Sentencing Guidelines and Statutory Maximums in Florida:
How Best to Respond to Apprendi, 74 FLA. B. J. 57, 58-59 (2000) (arguing Florida legislature should
not rush to implement new statutes because few Florida guideline sentences exceed the statutory
maximum).
374. Cammarere, supra note 3, at 41.
375. Id.
376. Greenhouse, supra note 2, at A19; see also Greenhouse, supra note 317, at A22 (determining
only New Jersey and North Carolina authorize judges rather than juries to make the hate-motive
determination); Mumma, supra, note 150, at Al (noting that New Jersey was one of the few states
that allowed a judge to find a hate crime had been committed by a preponderance of the evidence
standard).
New Jersey's legislature created a hate crime statute that was the exception, rather than the
norm. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 10,
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (No. 99-478), available at 2000 WL 35840 "What the
State of New Jersey seeks to uphold in this case is a radical departure" from the practices of other
states because this is a wide deviation from "traditional processes" and "constitutionally protected
values." Id. As such, most other states have constitutional hate statutes. See id.
377. See Mumma, supra, note 150, at Al. New Jersey's governor was unconcerned about the
Apprendi decision because the legislature only needs to rewrite the state's Ethnic Intimidation Act.
See id; see also Senate Panel OKs New Hate Crimes Law After U.S. Supreme Court Rejection,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Dec. 14, 2000 (describing how New Jersey Senate Judiciary
Committee enacted a new hate crime law that is now compatible with Apprendi); cf. Murray, supra
note 171, at A13 (finding Apprendi will make it much tougher to prosecute hate crimes in states
where the judge still makes the determination).
378. Mumma, supra, note 150, at Al.
379. Id. Brian Levin, from the Center for Hate and Extremism, conceded "'[e]ven though we lost,
it is not a blow to hate-crime laws,"' because what the court focuses on in Apprendi is sentencing
factors. Id.; see also Brian Levin, Bias Crimes: A Theoretical & Practical Overview, 4 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 165, 168-70 (1993) (summarizing how state hate crime legislation has evolved to
provide substantial protection to individuals).
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C. Individuals
1. Victims and Communities
Nearly all states have hate crime laws that protect individuals by
subjecting a defendant to harsher punishment if victims are targeted because
of their sexual orientation, race, or religion.8 Although most people in the
legal community believe that individuals will remain safe from hatred and
intimidation,"' actual victims of hate crimes, like Mattie Harrell, whose
house was shot at by Charles Apprendi, strongly disagree."2 While the
Court and Apprendi thought the extra sentence for his hate crime was too
stiff, Harrell believes it is not tough enough."' She lamented "'[e]veryone
felt they were going to throw the book at him and throw it hard." 3" Victims
380. Melanie Burney, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Court to Consider Whether Judge Should
Have Added Punishment, ABC NEWS.COM (Mar. 28, 2000), at http://www.abcnews.go.com
/sections/us/DailyNews/scotushatecrimes000328.html.
381. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 171, at A13. The Anti-Defamation League's counsel
minimized Apprendi's impact on hate crime laws because most states that give harsher sentences for
hate crimes already make hate motive part of the offense to be proven. Id; see also supra notes 376-
377 and accompanying text; supra note 379.
382. See Jessica Peterson, Medill News Service, The Aftermath of a Family's 1994 Nightmare, at
http://www.medill.northwestern.edu/docket/99-0478victims.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2002)
(providing excerpt from an American Civil Liberties Union report). Although Mattie still lives in
the same house where the shootings occurred, she believes it turned her dream home into "the scene
of 'a nightmare."' Id. She stated, "'[Charles Apprendi] destroyed a family .... [w]e could've been
happy. We'll probably never be the same again."' Id. When the incident occurred, Mattie and
Michael Sr.'s children - Michael Jr., was eight; Dawn, was thirteen; and Philip was fifteen years old.
Id. After the shootings, Michael Jr., began having nightmares, and behavioral problems at school.
Id.
Mattie and Michael Sr. divorced several years after the ordeal, and she now uses her maiden
name, Harrell. Id. Mattie claimed Apprendi's crimes "'were a big part"' of the decision to divorce.
id. Their daughter, Dawn, lives with Mattie, and their son, Michael Jr., currently resides with
Michael Sr., in the Atlantic City area. Id. Mattie testified against Apprendi in his first parole
hearing and remains apprehensive that someday Apprendi will be released from prison. Id. She
commented, "'Society has to know, hey, we're not going to tolerate this [hate crime] .... "' Id.; see
also Charles Bierbauer, Supreme Court to Hear Arguments on Hate Crimes New Jersey Man Claims
Law Unconstitutional, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/03/27/scotus.hate.02/index.html
(Mar. 27, 2000).
383. See Charles Bierbauer, Supreme Court to Hear Arguments on Hate Crimes New Jersey Man
Claims Law Unconstitutional, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/03/27/scotus.hate.02/
index.html (Mar. 27, 2000). Mattie Harrell recalled the damage to her house after Apprendi shot at
it because he allegedly wanted to send a message to her family that African-Americans were not
wanted in the neighborhood. See id. She stated, "[t]he place was just a mess - hitting the two glass
doors, hitting the moonlight, hitting the stucco on the side of the house." Id.
384. Id.; see also Amici Briefs in Apprendi, 9 N.J. LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER 613, Mar. 27, 2000,
at 13. The Anti-Defamation League's brief to the court argues that because hate crimes have such a
destructive effect on the community, states should be able to deter these crimes by having a judge
of hate crimes, such as Harrell, and the individuals in communities where
they occur are exceptionally susceptible to the emotional trauma caused by
hate offenders. 8 In particular, individuals who live in New Jersey may be
concerned about hate crimes being committed in their neighborhoods
because that state "has the highest number of reported bias crimes per capita
in the nation" and except for the year 2000, has also "had the highest number
of bias crimes in terms of actual numbers.""38  As the Anti-Defamation
League points out, hate crimes pose a unique danger because:
[h]ate-motivated crimes are among the most destructive of the
public safety and happiness. Such crimes have a distinctively
greater societal impact than other crimes because an attack on an
individual is also an attack on a larger group or community, with the
purpose of harming both. They are more likely than others to cause
an entire community to feel concerned for their safety, isolated and
unprotected by the justice system. This results in fear, anger and
suspicion - and even to crimes of retaliation. [Brian Levin, Bias
Crimes: A Theoretical & Practical Overview, 4 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 165, 167-68 (1993).] "One need look no further than the
recent social unrest in the [N]ation's cities to see that race-based
threats may cause more harm to society and to individuals than
other threats." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 433 [n.9]
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). 87
Thus, victims of hate crimes and others in the communities where they
occur may feel more physically and psychologically threatened after
Apprendi"' This is because it is harder to prove a hate crime occurred since
impose severe sanctions (as in a capital punishment case) by a preponderance of the evidence. See
id.; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 520 U.S. 466
(2000) (No. 99-478), available at LEXIS 1999 U.S. Briefs 478, at *4-5.
385. See Kristen M. Jasket, Note, Racists, Skinheads and Gay-Bashers Beware: Congress Joins
the Battle Against Hate Crimes By Proposing the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, 24 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 509, 537, 539-40 (2000) (stating "[h]ate crimes tear at the fabric of communities,
thereby creating fear and dissention among residents and result in neighborhoods with relations
among groups so strained that they can never be repaired"); see also Symposium, Hate-Crimes
Legislation: Local, State and Federal Perspectives, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 398 (2000)
(discussing the theory that bias-crime legislation gives disenfranchised individuals somewhere to
turn for protection); Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex:" Recognizing
Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 21, 23, 26-27 (1994) (detailing the effects
and policy behind hate crimes and concluding these crimes have an invidious impact on
communities).
386. Symposium, supra note 385, at 394 (quoting statements from Robin Parker, Deputy Attorney
General of New Jersey and Chief of New Jersey's Office of Bias Crime and Community Relations).
387. Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 520 U.S. 466
(2000) (No. 99-478), available at LEXIS 1999 U.S. Briefs 478, at *5.
388. See Project, Crimes Motivated by Hatred: The Constitutionality and Impact of Hate Crime
Legislation in the United States, I SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 29, 32 (1995). Recent studies
indicate hate crimes are increasing against African-Americans, Jews, and gays. Charles Bierbauer,
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the hate motive must be established beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury if
the defendant's punishment would be increased beyond the statutory
maximum. 89
2. Defendants
While victims and various communities may be disturbed by the
Apprendi decision, defendants and defense attorneys agree with Justice
Stevens that the decision is completely fair because "[t]he New Jersey
procedure challenged in this case is an unacceptable departure from the jury
tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system.' '3" For
defense attorneys, Apprendi validates the argument they have been making
"for years that it is wrong to give their clients more time based on evidence
never considered by a jury."39' Joseph O'Neill, Apprendi's attorney, recently
attended a hate crime symposium and argued that a ruling in favor of his
client would help safeguard individuals' liberty and constitutional rights.392
O'Neill argues that now everybody will have a better chance of protecting
themselves from an erroneous accusation because a jury and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt stand between them and their accuser. '93 Moreover, when
racially biased crimes are involved, Apprendi protects individuals from the
exceptionally damaging stigma of being a criminal, an immoral person and
also a racist. 9 Therefore, after Apprendi, individuals receive greater
protection' against erroneous convictions and social stigmatization because a
jury acts as the main fact-finder. " Finally, Apprendi shifts power back to
juries who are citizens in the defendant's community and can be held
Supreme Court to Hear Arguments on Hate Crimes New Jersey Man Claims Law Unconstitutional,
CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/03/27/scotus.hate.02/index.html (Mar. 27, 2000). Mark
Potok from the Southern Poverty Law Center recognized that "'[hlomosexuals are six times more
likely than Jews or Hispanics to be attacked because of who they are - and twice as likely as blacks
(to be attacked)."' Id.
389. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492-94.
390. Id. at 497.
391. Masters, supra note 2, at Al.
392. Symposium, supra note 385, at 399-403 (presenting defense counsel's version of the facts
and likely impact of Apprendi's holding). A New Jersey judge countered by arguing that New
Jersey's hate crime statute should be upheld because the Constitution does not allow people to
express their hatred through criminal acts. Id. at 420.
393. Id. at 403 (stating "[i]f the person cannot be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then
that person should not be convicted").
394. Id. (elaborating that those charged with a hate crime "should get their constitutional
safeguards just like anybody else charged with committing a crime").
395. See id.
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accountable for the sentences they impose.396 This is a movement away from
"experts" that are generally not answerable for their decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is now clear that with the exception of recidivism, "the jury must find
the facts that can lead to a sentence longer than what would otherwise be the
maximum.... "399  However, "the Apprendi case raised a more difficult
question that does not have a clear answer."3  Apprendi left open the issue
of whether it is constitutional for the judge to make "a number of crucial
findings that do not necessarily bring a sentence above the statutory
maximum, but that can end up increasing a sentence sharply within the
statutory range.000 Apprendi also does not answer whether factors that are
found by a judge to create a mandatory minimum sentence must be proved
to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.4 °' Thus, after Apprendi,
courts and legislatures are left with the Sisyphean task of determining the
precise limits of the Court's rule, which safeguards individuals' due process
rights, yet threatens state and federal sentencing schemes throughout the
nation if broadly applied. °2
Given that Apprendi has the potential to effect widespread change in the
world of criminal sentencing at local, state, and federal levels, courts should
continue to narrowly construe Apprendi because it is unclear how far the
Supreme Court plans to extend their decision .4" Based on the Court's
decision in Jones and Apprendi, it appears that the Court is attempting to
define the limits of McMillan.40' However, it remains uncertain whether the
396. Rosenberg, supra note 31, at 508-09.
397. Id. (noting sentencing factors shift power to judges and away from juries, thereby limiting the
role of the citizenry in governmental affairs).
398. Greenhouse, supra note 336, at A 18; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
399. Greenhouse, supra note 336, at A18.
400. Id. (emphasis added) (noting judges make these type of findings under the federal Sentencing
Guidelines).
401. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 521-22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for the broadest possible
reading of Apprendi), 550-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the confusion left in the wake of
Apprendi). Justice Thomas believes it is clear Apprendi would cover the situation where a defendant
could be sentenced between zero to ten years, and a finding of a fact by a judge would impose a
mandatory minimum sentence of five years. Id. at 521-22; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at
522 (concluding Apprendi's "central rationale - that it is wrong to convict a person of one crime and
impose punishment for another - logically applies to factors used to enhance penalties within the
statutory range"); Batey, supra note 373, at 59 (reasoning "the Apprendi Court strongly implied that
it would view such legislative behavior (what some commentators have already begun to call
'Apprendi evasion') as constitutionally suspect").
402. See Apprendi 530 U.S. at 481-494, 496-97; cf. 550-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (predicting
"disruption in the world of sentencing"); 565 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding the "Court's new
rule will likely impede legislative attempts to provide authoritative guidance as to how courts should
respond to the presence of traditional sentencing factors").
403. See supra Part V.
404. See Knoll & Singer, supra note 5, at 1112-16. "[H]aving gone from Mullaney to Patterson
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Court will expand Apprendi's holding in lieu of Patterson and McMillan,
which support broad legislative discretion, and Almendarez-Torres, which
upholds recidivism as a sentencing factor even though it extends the
conviction beyond the statutory maximum. ' Regardless, the Court has sent
the powerful message that it will not tolerate statutes that attempt to deprive
defendants of their constitutional rights by redefining elements of a crime as
sentencing factors, or using sentencing factors to extend a person's
conviction beyond the statutory maximum."°
Analisa Swan4 7
to McMillan to Almendarez-Torres - the Court is back at square one in assessing the legitimacy of
legislative declarations that remove from the shoulders of prosecutors the burden of proof of facts
that drastically affect sentences .... Winship lives again." Id. at 1118.
405. See id. at 1112-16; see also supra notes 73-124 and accompanying text. Typically the Court
has left state legislatures the power to define the elements of crimes and frequently the Court's "few
ventures into creating constitutional limits on the substantive criminal law have regularly proven
abortive." Lynch, supra note 268, at 322.
406. See generally Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-523; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 229-53
(1999); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 684-706 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359-75
(1970).
407. J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law, May, 2002; B.S., Business
Administration, cum laude, University of Southern California, 1999. I first learned about and
became interested in the Apprendi v. New Jersey case after I attended "The Supreme Court's Most
Extraordinary Term" symposium at Pepperdine, hosted by Professor Douglas W. Kmiec. There,
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky discussed Apprendi and other criminal law decisions.
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